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COMMENT
The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina: 1947 to 1991
Governmental structure in the United States, at both the state and
national levels, is based on the interaction of three independent coordi-
nate branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches.1
Each branch has the power and responsibility to preserve the integrity of
this tripartite scheme through a system of checks and balances.2 If one
branch oversteps its authority and infringes upon the powers of another,
this delicate balance is jeopardized.3 Judicial advisory opinions present
the potential for these threatening abuses of one branch's power.
An advisory opinion is issued by the highest judicial authority in the
state in response to a legislative or executive request for guidance con-
cerning the constitutionality of a proposed act.4 In North Carolina, the
need for judicial advisory opinions generally arises after the attorney gen-
eral has been consulted. The governor, as the state's chief executive, may
request an advisory opinion of the attorney general concerning a matter
of public importance.5 In his request, the governor ideally highlights the
crucial issues and the conflicting legal principles that are hindering him
from interpreting and executing the law.6 The attorney general, in con-
sultation with her staff in the Department of Justice, then renders an
1. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (delineating the powers of the three distinct branches of
the federal government).
2. See John V. Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct". Separation of Powers in North
Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (stating that "[t]he principle of restraining one power
with another is known as checks and balances; [along with the principle of the separation of
powers] it... is one of the fundamental principles of American constitutionalism").
3. See id.
4. See ALBERT R. ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERN-
MENT 253 (1918). Ellingwood was the preeminent authority on the advisory practice. He
defined an advisory opinion as
an opinion rendered by the highest judicial officers in the state, acting as individuals
and not in a judicial capacity, in response to a request for information as to the state
of the law or counsel as to the constitutionality of proposed action, coming from the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
Id.
5. The North Carolina General Statutes provide that one of the duties of the Attorney
General is "[t]o give, when required, his opinion upon all questions of law submitted to him by
the General Assembly, or by either branch thereof, or by the Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, or
any other State officer." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(5) (1987).
6. Telephone Interview with Tom Rosser, Attorney General's Office, Justice Depart-
ment, North Carolina (Sept. 20, 1991).
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opinion.7 The governor has discretion in determining whether or not to
follow the attorney general's opinion.'
On rare occasions when the attorney general is unable to resolve the
governor's legal difficulties, she may suggest that the governor consult
the justices of the state supreme court for their individual opinions on the
issue.' Between 1776 and 1947, the Governor of North Carolina called
upon the justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court to render advi-
sory opinions at least sixteen times.10 The justices, in most instances,
willingly complied.11 Between 1947 and 1985 the justices issued an addi-
tional six opinions." Since 1985, however, the justices have refused to
issue advisory opinions, claiming that the advisory practice violates the
requirement of separation of powers embodied in the state constitution. 13
This Comment describes the history and function of the advisory
opinion in England and the United States. It identifies the basis of a
court's authority to render advisory opinions, examines the national
trend to limit that authority severely, and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of the practice. The Comment concludes that the era of
the advisory opinion will come to a close in North Carolina in the next
few years, due to the current North Carolina judiciary's heightened
awareness of the separation-of-powers issues raised by the advisory
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 78-82, 114-15, 147-49, and 157-58 and accompanying text.
10. See Preston W. Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C. L. REV. 297,
301-29 (1949) (discussing the following advisory opinions: Advisory Opinion in re Home-
steads and Exemptions [of 1869], 227 N.C. 715, 43 S.E.2d 73 (1947); Advisory Opinion in re
House Bill No. 65, 227 N.C. 708, 43 S.E.2d 73 (1947); Advisory Opinion in re Legislative
Subsistence and Travel Allowance, 227 N.C. 705, 41 S.E.2d 749 (1947); Advisory Opinion in
re F. Donald Phillips, 226 N.C. 772, 39 S.E.2d 217 (1946); Advisory Opinion in re Yelton, 223
N.C. 845, 28 S.E.2d 567 (1944); Advisory Opinion in re Whether the Elections held on Tues-
day After the First Monday in November, 1933, was the Next General Election Following the
Adjournment of the 1933 Session of the General Assembly, 207 N.C. 879, 181 S.E. 557 (1934);
Advisory Opinion in re Resolution of Request and Summary of McLean and Murphy Bills,
204 N.C. 806, 172 S.E. 474 (1933); Advisory Opinion in re Municipal Finance Bill, 227 N.C.
718 (1921); Advisory Opinion in re Omnibus Justice of the Peace Bill, 227 N.C. 717 (1919);
Advisory Opinion in re Municipal Annexations, 227 N.C. 716 (1917); Advisory Opinion in re
Leasing the North Carolina Railroad, 120 N.C. 623, 28 S.E. 18 (1897); Advisory Opinion in re
Judicial Term of Office, 114 N.C. 923 (1894); Advisory Opinion in re Term of Office of the
General Assembly That was Elected in April, 1868, 64 N.C. 785 (1870); Advisory Opinion in
re William H. Hughes, 61 N.C. 57 (1867); Advisory Opinion in re J.G. Martin, 60 N.C. 153
(1863); and Waddell v. Berry, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 518 (1848)).
11. The justices declined to issue an opinion in Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opin-
ions, 196 N.C. 828, 829 (1929); see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 72-184 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 185-245 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY OF THE ADVISORY OPINION
A. In England
The practice of English judges giving "extra-judicial" opinions was
pervasive in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in which
there was no separation of powers.15 The king, as sovereign of the state,
exercised legislative, executive, and judicial functions with the aid of his
advisors. 6 He legislated "with the advice of the Magnum Conilium,"'
comprised of "ecclesiastics and tenants in capite,"'18 and he rendered jus-
tice through the curia Regis, which included financial advisors and
judges.' 9
Examples of requests by English kings for the advice of their judges
abound. In 1388, Richard II asked the judges to state their opinions
regarding "certain acts of the last Parliament, and secured from them
sealed statements that his ministers could not be impeached without his
consent."20 Richard II probably procured these opinions by extortion,
but no one questioned his authority to demand them.2 In 1717, George
I consulted the judges concerning the care, education, and marriages of
his grandchildren.22 He also requested their opinions regarding the
king's authority to pardon all or part of a judgment.23
Occasionally the king tried to procure judicial opinions prior to the
time an actual case involving the source of the legal questions came
before the court.24 In Stafford's Case2" in 1485, when the king asked for
the judges' opinions on the day before they were to hear the case, the
judges objected, insisting that they should wait and adjudicate the matter
14. See infra notes 335-44 and accompanying text.
15. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Magnum Coneilium "gathered primarily to pay homage." Id. The judges
were members of the Magnum Concilium and served as advisers to the House of Lords. Id. at
2, 25.
18. Under old English law, a tenant in capite was a "tenant in chief; one who held imme-
diately under the king, in right of his crown and dignity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1466
(6th ed. 1990).
19. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 1-2.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9. The question arose in regard to Sir John Fenwick's Case. Id. 8-9.
24. Id. at 9. The monarch would attempt to procure the judges' opinions on procedural
questions, the state of the law, or the "merits of the case." Id.
25. Id.
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before issuing an opinion.2 6 Although the king abandoned his request, 27
the judges clearly had sown a seed by refusing to pass judgment on a case
yet to come before them.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the judges appeared to
question further the wisdom of issuing advisory opinions.2" Chief Justice
Bridgman, in the 1662 case of Beckman v. Maplesden,29 noted the value
of each party's ability to present its side in litigation.30 In 1711, in Whis-
ton's Case,3" the judges explicitly reserved the right to make decisions in
a manner contrary to the opinions they issued.3 2 In the case of Lord
George Sackville33 in 1760, Lord Mansfield stressed the judges'
"avers[ion] to giving extra-judicial opinions, especially where they affect
a particular case" and reminded the king that the judges were not bound
by "this answer."34
In 1912, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council announced
that the issuance of advisory opinions was impermissible, unless a statute
expressly granted such authority.35 In response to the declaration, Par-
liament passed a number of statutes permitting judicial advisory opin-
ions.3 6 The Judicial Committee Act allowed the king to seek and obtain
legal advice "on any point whatsoever."37 Likewise, under the Local
Government Act of 1888, local executive bodies could refer certain ques-
tions to the High Court of Justice for a decision. 38 The statutes effec-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 9-16.
29. 124 Eng. Rep. 468 (1662).
30. Id. at 478. Lord Mansfield observed "a difference between cases adjudged upon de-
bate and having counsel on both sides, and resolution upon a case reported or referred to
them." Id.; see infra notes 152-53, 286-87 and accompanying text.
31. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 14.
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Lord Sackville's Case, 28 Eng. Rep. 940 (1760).
34. Id. at 941. Advisory opinions first appeared in the United States in 1760, after Lord
Sackville's Case. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 15-16.
35. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 16-17.
36. Id. at 17-18.
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 17-18. The Local Government Act of 1888 provided,
"If any question arises, or is about to arise, as to whether any business, power, duty
or liability, is or is not transferred to any county council or joint committee under
this Act, that question, without prejudice to any other mode of trying it, may, on the
application of a chairman of quaiter sessions, or of the county council, committee, or
other local authority concerned, be submitted for decision to the High Court of Jus-
tice in such summary manner as, subject to any rules of Court, may be directed by
the Court; and the Court, after hearing such parties and taking such evidence (if any)
as it thinks just, shall decide the question."
1856 [Vol. 70
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tively nullified the finding that advisory opinions were impermissible.3 9
More significantly, the English statutes served as models for permitting
the advisory practice in the United States.
40
B. In the United States
Unlike the English king, the President of the United States may not
request advisory opinions of the federal judiciary.41 In 1793 when war
erupted between England and France, President Washington and then
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson put twenty-nine questions to the Jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court, requesting their advice con-
cerning American neutrality.42 The Justices refused to answer on the
basis that such advice to another branch of government would violate the
separation of powers.43 Walled off from the judiciary, President Wash-
ington consulted his cabinet instead.' This proved to be the first and last
time a President of the United States would request that the United
States Supreme Court perform a purely advisory function.
Among the states, the status of advisory opinions differs. Eight ju-
risdictions currently permit their courts to issue advisory opinions.4 5 Of
the eight, seven explicitly authorize the advisory practice in their state
constitutions.46 Six other states that once permitted advisory opinions
Id. at 17 n.62 (quoting 51 & 52 Vict. ch. 41, § 29 (Eng.)).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 18.
41. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-67 (3d ed. 1988) (reprinting correspondence between Jefferson and the
Supreme Court); see also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (requiring the
existence of a "genuine adversary issue between the parties"); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 363 (1911) (refusing to hear a matter in the absence of an actual dispute between
adverse parties).
42. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 57-58. Jefferson asked the Justices, "May we, within
our own ports, sell ships to both parties, prepared merely for merchandise? May they be
pierced for guns?" BATOR, supra note 41, at 66.
43. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 58-59. The Justices wrote that the three departments
of the government, "being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of
a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propri-
ety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to." BATOR, supra note 41, at 66.
44. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 59. The actions taken by President Washington laid
the foundation for international law in the United States. Id.
45. They are Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Edsall, supra note 10, at 299 n.4.
46. Id. The Colorado Constitution provides that "[t]he supreme court shall give its opin-
ion upon important questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the sen-
ate, or the house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be published in connection with
the reported decision of said court." COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
According to the Florida Constitution,
[t]he governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices of the supreme court
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without constitutional authority no longer allow the advisory practice at
all.47 North Carolina is the only state in the Union today which permits
advisory opinions without explicit constitutional authorization.48
II. THE ADVISORY OPINION IN NORTH CAROLINA
Like the framers of the United States Constitution, the members of
the North Carolina Constitutional Convention in 1776 carefully dele-
gated specific authority to each of the three branches of government.4 9
The current state constitution retains this original structure, vesting leg-
as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question affecting
his executive powers and duties. The justices shall, subject to their rules of proce-
dure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented and shall
render their written opinion not earlier than ten days from the filing and docketing of
the request, unless in their judgment the delay would cause public injury.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
The Maine Constitution provides that "[t]he Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall
be obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions,
when required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives." ME. CONST. art. 6, § 3.
The Massachusetts Constitution provides that "[e]ach branch of the legislature, as well as
the governor or the council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the
supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." MASS.
CONST. art. II, § 83. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 expressly provided for advisory
opinions. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 30. In 1820 and again in 1853, however, various
members of succeeding Massachusetts constitutional conventions proposed amendments re-
pealing the advisory opinion clause. Id. at 35, 37. The proposals met defeat both times. Id. at
35-38; see infra note 329 and accompanying text. Despite these results, it is not certain
whether the proposed repeals of the clause or other amendments with which they were coupled
received the negative votes. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 36, 38.
New Hampshire's constitution provides that "[e]ach branch of the legislature as well as
the governor and council shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the
supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions." N.H. CONST. pt.
2, art. 74.
The Rhode Island Constitution provides that "[t]he judges of the supreme court shall give
their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or by
either house of the general assembly." R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
The South Dakota Constitution provides that "Itihe Governor has authority to require
opinions of the Supreme Court upon important questions of law involved in the exercise of his
executive power and upon solemn occasions." S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5.
47. They are Connecticut, Kentucky, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and Penn-
sylvania. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 65-78. The Connecticut judges issued their last advi-
sory opinion in 1867. Id. at 72. The Kentucky judges issued only one advisory opinion, in
1881. Id. at 73. The Nebraska judges issued advisory opinions between 1883 and 1894. Id. at
74-76; see Edsall, supra note 10, at 298 n.3. Unlike these states, North Carolina has issued
more than twenty-one advisory opinions since 1848 and currently permits the advisory prac-
tice. See supra note 10; infra notes 57-184 and accompanying text.
48. Edsall, supra note 10, at 299 n.4 and accompanying text.
49. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4. For instance, the Mecklenburg
County delegates to the North Carolina Provincial Congress were instructed
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islative power in the general assembly,5" executive power in the gover-
nor,51 and judicial power in a General Court of Justice.5 2 The members
of the state convention also specifically addressed the separation-of-pow-
ers issue, providing that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judi-
cial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other."5 3 This language remains in the state constitution. No
such explicit provision appears in the Federal Constitution.
54
Despite the constitutional convention's efforts to isolate the three
That you shall endeavor that the Government shall be so formed that the derived
inferior power shall be divided into three branches distinct from each other, viz:
The power of making laws
The power of executing laws and
The power of Judging.
State ex rel Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 597, 286 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1982) (quoting 10 COLO-
NIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 870a and 870b (W. Saunders ed., 1890)).
50. See N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. II, § 1 (providing that "[t]he legislative power of the
State shall be vested in the General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives"). Concerning the power of the General Assembly, North Carolina's consti-
tution provides that
[e]ach house shall be judge of the qualifications and elections of its own members,
shall sit upon its own adjournment from day to day, and shall prepare bills to be
enacted into laws. The two houses may jointly adjourn to any future day or other
place. Either house may, of its own motion, adjourn for a period not in excess of
three days.
Id. § 20.
51. See id. art. III, § 1.
52. See id. art. IV, § 1. Extending specific protection to the judiciary, the North Carolina
Constitution provides that
[t]he judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Section 3 [concerning the
judicial powers of administrative agencies] of this Article, be vested in a Court for the
Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice. The General Assembly
shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction
that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall
it establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this Article.
Id.
53. Id. art. I, § 6. For a discussion of the history of the principle of the separation of
powers under the state and federal constitutions, see Orth, supra note 2, at 3-6.
54. See supra notes I and 53 and accompanying text. Professor Orth points out that the
separation of powers is not absolute under either the state or Federal Constitution. Orth,
supra note 2, at 1-17. He notes that although the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 con-
tained an explicit separation-of-powers provision, it also provided that the general assembly
could elect the "Governor, the members of the Council of State, the Attorney General, the
State Treasurer, the State Secretary, and all the judges." Id. at 5-6. These provisions remained
in effect for over 100 years, until the revision of the constitution in 1868. Id. at 6. Orth points
out that the Supreme Court has declared that the separation of powers, implicit in the federal
constitution, is not" 'airtight.'" Id. at 16 (quoting Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S.
425, 443 (1976)). In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court held that the legisla-
ture could infringe upon the executive branch if the "impact is justified by an overriding need
to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." 433 U.S. at 443.
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branches of government from one another, North Carolina's judiciary
throughout history has rendered advisory opinions at the request of the
executive branch. The North Carolina Supreme Court has grounded its
authority to render the opinions in the state constitutional provision
granting it "jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts
below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.""5 The court's advi-
sory practice has not gone undisputed, however; legislators and judges
alike have contested the constitutionality of this practice ever since its
inception in 1848.56 In order to illuminate the controversy surrounding
the granting of advisory opinions in North Carolina, a brief overview of
the earlier advisory opinions follows along with an in-depth review of
the more recent advisory opinions and requests for advisory opinions.
A. Before 1947
Preston W. Edsall's 1949 article, The Advisory Opinion in North
Carolina,57 serves as the authoritative commentary on advisory opinions
issued by the North Carolina Supreme Court prior to 1947. Edsall noted
that the common thread running through the early advisory opinions
was the justices' concern with defining the parameters of their authority
to issue such opinions." In its first advisory opinion, Waddell v. Berry,59
the court set forth the rules it would follow in issuing advisory opin-
ions.'" The Waddell court noted that in rendering an advisory opinion
the judges must act individually, not as a body; they must act voluntarily,
not in response to a legal obligation; and they may act only if the "nature
of the question" deems it appropriate.6" Subsequent advisory opinions
55. N.C CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 12. The state constitution further provides that
[t]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over "issues of fact" and "questions of fact"
shall be the same exercised by it prior to the adoption of this Article, and the Court
may issue any remedial writs necessary to give it general supervision and control over
the proceedings of the other courts.
Id.
56. See Edsall, supra note 10, at 327-43.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 299; see infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text (discussing the rules
currently followed in issuing advisory opinions).
59. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 518 (1848).
60. Id. at 518.
61. In Waddell, Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin explained the judges' view of their role in
advising the legislature:
Although not strictly an act of official obligation, which could not be declined, yet
from the nature of the questions and the purposes to which the answers are to be
applied-being somewhat of a judicial character-the Judges have deemed it a duty
of courtesy and respect to the Senate to consider the points submitted to them and to
give their opinions thereon.
1860 [Vol. 70
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employed these basic guidelines. According to Advisory Opinion in re
Homesteads and Exemptions in 1869, the justices could not "prejudge
questions of law" or give advice regarding questions that might come
before them.6 2 The judges could answer only questions of "'manifest
necessity.' ,63 Although they could not answer political questions, the
judges were permitted to answer legal questions.' 4 Finally, no judge
could render an opinion regarding an issue with which he was personally
involved.6" Thus, before 1947, the substance of advisory opinions in
North Carolina dealt largely with defining the scope of the judiciary's
authority to render such opinions.
Various members of the legislature and courts challenged the advi-
sory practice in the first fifty years of its existence in North Carolina. In
1897, when the North Carolina House of Representatives sought the
opinions of the North Carolina Supreme Court justices concerning the
validity of a railroad lease, one representative protested that the justices
lacked authority to give such advice.66 He asserted that" 'the [s]upreme
[c]ourt had no business in this matter, save to construe a law after its
enactment; that there are three coordinate branches of the government,
each in its own place.' ,67 Unmoved by the objection, the justices readily
answered the legislature's question.68 In 1929, however, while retaining
the advisory practice, the supreme court modified the manner in which
advisory opinions could be issued.69 Refusing to render an advisory
opinion as a court, the court stated that a question could be addressed to
the justices individually.70 Having thus changed the form of the advisory
practice, the judges continued to render advisory opinions during the first
half of the twentieth century.71
Id.
62. Advisory Opinion in re Homesteads and Exemptions, 227 N.C. 715, 715-16 (1869).
Although issued in 1869, the Homesteads opinion was not published until 1947.
63. Edsall, supra note 10, at 305 (quoting Associate Justice Rodman in Advisory Opinion
in re Term of Office of the General Assembly that was Elected in April, 1868, 64 N.C. 785, 794
(1870)); see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
64. Edsall, supra note 10, at 305 (quoting Associate Justice Rodman in Term of Office, 64
N.C. at 794).
65. Id. at 311-12; see Advisory Opinion in re Judicial Term of Office, 114 N.C. 923, 924
(1894) (Chief Justice Shepherd and Associate Justices Avery and Burwell, abstaining).
66. See Edsall, supra note 10, at 313. The opinion was Advisory Opinion in re Leasing the
North Carolina Railroad, 120 N.C. 623, 28 S.E. 18 (1897).
67. Edsall, supra note 10, at 314.
68. See Leasing the North Carolina Railroad, 120 N.C. at 623-24; Edsall. supra note 10, at
314.
69. See Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinions, 196 N.C. 828, 829 (1929).
70. Id.
71. See Edsall, supra note 10, at 319-29.
1992] 1861
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B. After 1947
The justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court have issued six
advisory opinions since 1947, concerning a number of procedural and
political issues that have yielded a variety of responses from the justices.
The arbitrariness of these responses explains the justices' recent reluc-
tance to issue advisory opinions.72
Filling a vacancy in 1950. Upon the death of Associate Justice
Seawell on October 14, 1950, Governor W. Kerr Scott was responsible
for appointing a new justice to fill the vacant seat on the North Carolina
Supreme Court.73 Governor Scott was uncertain how long the new jus-
tice would be able to serve before he would be forced to seek election to
the supreme court.74 The answer to this question was important, for if
an election were needed in the next month, the Governor had to inform
the State Board of Elections so it could prepare for the election by print-
ing and distributing ballots.7 The Governor also had to inform the ma-
jor political parties so that they could nominate candidates for the
position.76 Under these pressures, the Governor wrote the Attorney
General for advice concerning the course of action he should take.
77
Attorney General Harry McMullan wrote Governor Scott that after
considering the state constitution, 7 the North Carolina General Stat-
72. See infra notes 275-88 and accompanying text.
73. Advisory Opinion in re Time of Election to Fill Vacancy in Office of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 232 N.C. 737, 737, 61 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1950).
74. Id. Specifically, the Governor did not know whether the appointee would hold the
position until the next general election, to be held in less than a month, or whether the ap-
pointee would hold the judgeship until the succeeding general election in 1952. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 737-38, 61 S.E.2d at 531.
77. Id. at 738, 61 S.E.2d at 531.
78. Id. Article IV, Section 25 of the North Carolina Constitution provided that
[a]ll vacancies occurring in the offices provided for by this Article of the Constitution
shall be filled by the appointments of the Governor, unless otherwise provided for,
and the appointees shall hold their places until the next regular election for members
of the General Assembly, when elections shall be held to fill such offices. If any
person, elected or appointed to any of said offices, shall neglect or [sic] fail to qualify,
such office shall be appointed to, held and filled as provided in case of vacancies
occurring therein. All incumbents of said offices shall hold until their successors are
qualified.
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 25 (1875), quoted in Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C.
at 739, 61 S.E.2d at 529.
Attorney General McMullan noted that in 1875 the state constitutional convention had
added the phrase "for members of the General Assembly" to prevent the result reached in
Cloud v. Wilson, 72 N.C. 155 (1875). Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C. at 739-40, 61
S.E.2d at 530. Under the result in Cloud, a supreme court appointee potentially could hold
1862 [Vol. 70
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utes,79 and applicable case law in North Carolina,"0 "I am unable to fur-
nish you with any opinion upon which you could safely rely."8 He then
suggested that the Governor request an advisory opinion from the jus-
office for as long as eight years before being faced with an election. See id. at 740, 61 S.E.2d at
530.
In addition to § 25 of Article IV, Attorney General McMullan quoted Article III, § 13 of
the North Carolina Constitution, which provided that
[t]he respective duties of the Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent
of Public Instruction and Attorney-General shall be prescribed by law. If the office
of any of said officers shall be vacated by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be
the duty of the Governor to appoint another until the disability be removed or his
successor be elected and qualified. Every such vacancy shall be filled by election at
the first general election that occurs more than thirty days after the vacancy has
taken place, and the person chosen shall hold the office for the remainder of the
unexpired term fixed in the first section of this Article.
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 13 (1873); see Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C. at
739, 61 S.E.2d at 529-30. The Attorney General apparently referred to this constitutional
provision by analogy; it involves the Governor's power to make appointments to fill vacancies
in certain offices and the length of the term the appointee may serve, although it does not
involve the office of associate justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
79. The Attorney General quoted Section 163-7 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
see Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C. at 740, 61 S.E.2d at 530, which in 1950 provided
in part that
[wlhenever any vacancies shall exist by reason of death, resignation, or otherwise, in
any of the following offices .... justices of the supreme court,... the same shall be
filled by elections, to be held in the manner and places and under the same regula-
tions and rules as prescribed for general elections, at the next regular election for
members of the general assembly which shall occur more than thirty days after such
vacancy, except as otherwise provided for in the constitution.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-7 (1943) (repealed 1967).
Attorney General McMullan also referred to § 7-48 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes, which, at the time of the opinion, provided that
[a]ll vacancies occurring by death, resignation or otherwise in the offices of justice of
the supreme or judge of the superior court of the state shall be filled for the unexpired
term at the next general election for members of the general assembly held after such
vacancy is created. The persons elected at such election shall be commissioned by
the governor immediately after the ascertainment of the result in the manner pro-
vided by law, and shall qualify and enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office
within ten days after receiving such commission.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-48 (1943) (repealed 1969); see Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C.
at 741, 61 S.E.2d at 530-31.
80. The Attorney General found no precedent to aid him. The closest case was that of
Rodwell v. Rowland, 137 N.C. 617, 50 S.E. 319 (1905); see also Time of Election to Fill Va-
cancy, 232 N.C. at 741, 61 S.E.2d at 531 (citing Rodwell but finding it inapplicable in the case
involving the election on educational amendments). In Rodwell, the court addressed the issue
of filling a vacancy in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court. Rodwell, 137 N.C. at 619,
50 S.E. at 320. The court held that an appointee to a vacancy does not hold office for a full
term if a regular election intervenes between the occurrence of the vacancy and the expiration
of the term, unless the appointee is duly elected. Id. at 635-36, 50 S.E. at 322-23.
81. Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C. at 739, 61 S.E.2d at 529.
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tices of the North Carolina Supreme Court. 2
Taking Attorney General McMullan's advice, Governor Scott wrote
the justices, posing his question about the proper construction of Section
25 of Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution.8 3 The justices re-
plied that the answer to the Governor's question was "clear and unam-
biguous": S" an election should be held on November 7, 1950. s5 Writing
separately, Associate Justice Barnhill reminded the Governor and the
court8 6 that the practice of issuing advisory opinions should be sparing,
87
"interpose[d] ... only in the event of an emergency gravely affecting the
public interest. '88  No such emergency, he argued, was present in con-
struing the constitutional provision. 9 Because the Attorney General was
"reluctant to give.., an unqualified answer, but, instead, advise[d the
governor] to seek an opinion from [the supreme court]," '9 and because
the Governor had to act expediently and needed "competent legal ad-
vice"'" to do so, however, Justice Barnhill felt "constrained to join [his]
associates in complying with [the] request."92
Holding an election to consider educational amendments. In April
1956, the Advisory Committee on Education 93 drafted several proposed
amendments to the North Carolina Constitution addressing the problem
of education in the state. 94 The advisory committee requested that Gov-
ernor Luther H. Hodges call a special session of the General Assembly to
82. Id. at 741-42, 61 S.E.2d at 531.
83. Id. at 737-38, 61 S.E.2d at 531-32.
84. Id. at 742, 61 S.E.2d at 532.
85. Id. Associate Justices Devin, Winborne, Denny, and Ervin signed an opinion written
by Chief Justice Stacy. Id.
86. Justice Barnhill noted that "[flrom a legal standpoint the question... pose[d] presents
no difficulty," and "[t]he language of [N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 25] is so clear and unambiguous
it does not require interpretation." Id. at 743, 61 S.E.2d at 532-33 (Barnhill, J).
87. Id. at 743, 61 S.E.2d at 532 (Barnhill, J).
88. Id. (Barnhill, J.); see infra note 243 and accompanying text.
89. Time of Election to Fill Vacancy, 232 N.C. at 743, 61 S.E.2d at 532 (Barnhill, J).
90. Id (Barnhill, J).
91. Id. (Barnhill, J).
92. Id. (Barnhill, J).
93. The Advisory Committee on Education was created by legislative resolution to ex-
amine race relations in the North Carolina public school system, particularly the "problems
growing out of the segregation decisions of the United States Supreme Court." NORTH CARO-
LINA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, JULY 23RD REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (1956); see also NORTH CAROLINA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EDU-
CATION, APRIL 5TH REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ET AL. 3 (1956)
(stating that the obligation of the Advisory Committee on Education was to study "the educa-
tional problem as affected by race").




authorize an election to ratify the proposed amendments.9" Because the
Governor did not want the educational amendments to be involved "in
any manner" in "partisan politics,"96 he recommended that the election
occur at a time when no constitutional officers were up for election, so
that the people would be voting only on the proposed amendments. 97
In making his recommendation, Governor Hodges recognized that
the North Carolina Constitution requires the general assembly to submit
any amendments "at the next general election."98 He also realized that a
"general election" as commonly understood occurs each November.99
Because the state constitution did not define "general election," however,
the Governor wrote Attorney General William B. Rodman, Jr., for ad-
vice as to whether the special election, held prior to November, would
constitute a general election within the meaning of the state
constitution. 100
Attorney General Rodman replied that he considered the special
election to be a "general election."10 1 Apparently unconvinced, the Gov-
ernor then consulted the justices of the North Carolina Supreme




98. Id.; see N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIII (1875) (revised in N.C. CONST. of 1970, art.
XIII). Article XIII consisted of two sections at the time of the 1956 advisory opinion. Section
1 provided that
[n]o convention of the people of this State shall ever be called by the General Assem-
bly unless by the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each house of the
General Assembly, and except the proposition, convention or no convention, be first
submitted to the qualified voters of the whole State, at the next general election, in a
manner to be prescribed by law. And should a majority of the votes cast be in favor
of said convention, it shall assemble on such day as may be prescribed by the General
Assembly.
Id. § 1. Section 2 provided that
[n]o part of the Constitution of this State shall be altered unless a bill to alter the
same shall have been agreed to by three-fifths of each house of the General Assembly.
And the amendment or amendments so agreed to shall be submitted at the next
general election to the qualified voters of the whole State, in such manner as may be
prescribed by law. And in the event of their adoption by a majority of the votes cast,
such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitution of this
State.
Id. § 2.
99. General Election, 244 N.C. at 748, 93 S.E.2d at 854.
100. Id. Appointed by Governor Hodges in 1955, Attorney General Rodman served in
that office until August 1956, when he was appointed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
RuFus L. EDMISTEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1989-1990 (Jon L.
Cheney, Jr. ed.).
101. General Election, 244 N.C. at 748, 93 S.E.2d at 854.
102. Id. at 748-49, 93 S.E.2d at 854. Governor Hodges posed the following question:
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the Attorney General: the special election would constitute a general
election, if it complied with the "general election laws."1 3 The justices
cited two previous advisory opinions as authority for their opinion. 10
Holding a bond election in 1961. In 1961, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly ratified the "Capital Improvement Bond Election Bill."' '
The bill provided that qualified voters of North Carolina were to vote on
whether the state should issue a certain bond, and the Governor was to
set a date for the election.10 6 If any other bonds were up for election at
the same time as the Capital Improvement Bond, the governor was to
schedule the election involving all the bonds on the same day. 107 Finally,
the bill provided that the election would be conducted according to the
general laws of North Carolina with the exception that no absentee bal-
lots would be permitted. 1 8
At the same time it ratified the "Capital Improvement Board Elec-
tion Bill," the General Assembly ratified six other acts."°9 Under the
terms of the acts, the people of North Carolina were to consider six
amendments "at the next general election." 110 After Governor Terry
Sanford slated the bond election for November 1961, a question arose as
to whether the bond election was to be treated as a general election.I 1 If
it were a general election, the elections involving the six acts and the
May the General Assembly, at its special session to be held in July, provide for the
holding, prior to November, of a Statewide election, so as to meet the constitutional
requirements of a general election, when the only questions which may be submitted
to the electorate on the day designated for the election are the ratification or rejection
of:
(a) Constitutional amendments proposed by Chapters 1169, 1245, and 1253 of
the 1955 Session of the General Assembly, and
(b) Such constitutional amendment or amendments as may be duly proposed at
the special session of the General Assembly.
Id. at 749, 93 S.E.2d at 854.
103. Id. at 749-50, 93 S.E.2d at 854. The justices who participated in the opinion were
Chief Justice Barnhill and Associate Justices Winborne, Denny, Johnson, Parker, Bobbitt, and
Higgins. Id. at 750, 93 S.E.2d at 854.
104. Id.; see also Advisory Opinion in re Opinions of the Justices, 207 N.C. 879, 880, 181
S.E. 557, 557 (1934) (addressing "whether the election held on Tuesday after the first Monday
in November, 1933, ... [was] the 'next general election' following the adjournment of the 1933
session of the General Assembly"); Advisory Opinion in re Opinions of the Justices, 204 N.C.
806, 808-09, 172 S.E. 474, 476 (1933) (regarding calling a convention to vote on a proposed
amendment).
105. Advisory Opinion in re General Elections, 255 N.C. 747, 747, 127 S.E.2d 1, 1 (1961).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 747, 127 S.E.2d at 1-2.
108. Id. at 747, 127 S.E.2d at 2.
109. Id. at 747-48, 127 S.E.2d at 2.
110. Id. at 748, 127 S.E.2d at 2.
111. Id.
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Capital Improvement Bond would be held on the same day, at the next
general election in November 1962.112 The Governor thus would not be
able to hold the special bond election in 1961.
Unable to resolve the dispute regarding the dates, Governor Sanford
requested advice from Attorney General Wade Bruton, who replied that
he did not think that the bond election was a general election.' 13 Report-
ing that the attorney general "ha[d] advised [him] that the question is not
altogether free from doubt,"" 4 Governor Sanford wrote to the justices of
the state supreme court, asking for their opinions regarding the
matter. 115
Examining the language of the bill and acts, the justices found that
the Governor properly could call the bond election for November
1961.116 The justices noted that, under the terms of the acts, the six
amendments were to be submitted "at the next general election to the
qualified voters.., under the same rules and regulations governing gen-
eral elections in this State.""' 7 The rules governing elections in North
Carolina permit the use of absentee ballots,"I8 but the terms of the bond
bill explicitly prohibited their use." 9 The justices concluded that the
drafters did not intend for the vote on the bond issue to occur at a gen-
eral election. 120 Thus, the two elections could not be held on the same
day.
121
Prisoners on Work Release. In 1966, Attorney General Wade
Bruton issued an opinion in which he asserted that no difference existed
between "farming out" prisoners for hire and permitting prisoners to
participate in a "work release" program.'22 Both practices, he found,
112. Id. at 749, 127 S.E.2d at 2.
113. Id. at 748, 127 S.E.2d at 2.
114. Id.
115. Governor Sanford posed his question as follows:
Would a bond election called pursuant to Chapter 1037 of the 1961 Session Laws
meet the constitutional requirements of a general election, so as to require the consti-
tutional amendments proposed by Chapter[s] 313, 459, 466, 591, 840 and 1169 of the
1961 Session Laws [to] be submitted to the qualified voters of the State?
Id.
116. Id. at 750, 127 S.E.2d at 3. The following Associate Justices joined Chief Justice
Winborne in the advisory opinion: Denny, Parker, Bobbitt, Higgins, Rodman, and Moore. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-53 to -69 (1952) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-226 to -239 (1991)).
119. General Elections, 255 N.C. at 750, 127 S.E.2d at 3.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Advisory Opinion in re Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. 727, 727-28, 152 S.E.2d 225,
225-26 (1966).
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were illegal if they involved prisoners who had been sentenced on a
"charge of Murder, Manslaughter, Rape, Attempt to Commit Rape, or
Arson."' 23 As a result of the Attorney General's opinion, the North
Carolina Board of Paroles withdrew the work release privileges of 136
prisoners who did not qualify for "farming out" under the state constitu-
tion, but who had previously qualified for the work release program
under a state statute.' 24
Governor Dan K. Moore recognized the multiple advantages of the
work release program, 25 noting society's strong interest in rehabilitating
prisoners who had been charged with the offenses which disqualified
them from being "farmed out."' 2 6 Seeking to find a way to continue the
program, he requested a judicial advisory opinion concerning the Attor-
ney General's interpretation of the statute. 127 The Governor pointed out
to the justices that neither the Attorney General's opinion nor the Board
of Paroles' letter withdrawing the prisoners' privileges mentioned the
amendment to the state constitution that authorized the general assembly
123. Id. at 727, 152 S.E.2d at 225; see N.C. CoNST. art. XI, § 1 (1875); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 148-33.1 (1963).
124. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 727, 152 S.E.2d at 225. The Attorney General
based his opinion on a provision of the North Carolina Constitution, which permitted the state
prison department to "farm out" all prisoners except those who have been sentenced on a
"charge of murder, manslaughter, rape, attempt to commit rape, or arson." N.C. CONST. art.
XI, § 1 (1875). As originally intended, the purpose of the "farming out" provision was to
provide industry with cheap labor and save taxpayers the cost of boarding prisoners who did
not pose a threat to life. See Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 727-28, 152 S.E.2d at 225. In
light of the state constitutional provision, the Attorney General advised the chairman of the
Board of Paroles that § 148-33.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes likewise prohibited
the Board of Paroles from granting work release privileges to prisoners charged with the same
life-threatening offenses. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1 (1963) and infra note 131.
125. The work release program enabled prisoners to "work at regular jobs, receive wages
comparable to those received by free men performing similar work, pay taxes on their earn-
ings, pay the cost of their prison keep, contribute to the support of their dependents, and
accumulate savings to be paid to them upon their discharge." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1(0
(1963); see Work Release Statute, 268 N.C at 730-31, 152 S.E.2d at 227. The court noted that
one effect of withdrawing the work release privileges was to put these prisoners "back behind
bars" and make them a "burden" on North Carolina taxpayers. Work Release Statute, 268
N.C. at 727-28, 152 S.E.2d at 225. Further, withdrawing the privileges denied employers a
"highly-valued" labor force. Id. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 225. Finally, it handicapped the prison-
ers, since they could not reap the benefits of being slowly incorporated back into society. Id.
Released suddenly, the prisoners had little opportunity for rehabilitation. Id.
126. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 226.
127. Id. Governor Moore posed his question to the court as follows:
Does the provision of Article XI, Section 1, of the Constitution of North Carolina,
prohibiting the farming out of prisoners sentenced on charges of Murder, Man-
slaughter, Rape, Attempt to Commit Rape, or Arson, prohibit such prisoners from
participation in the Work Release Program authorized by G.S. 148-33.1?
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to create the Board of Paroles and to prescribe rules for the Board.121
The Governor felt that the amendment empowered the general assembly
to enact the statute which permitted prisoners convicted of the life-
threatening charges to participate in the work release program.
129
Six of seven justices agreed with Governor Moore, finding that the
prisoners could participate in the work release program despite the pro-
hibition against their being "farmed out."' 130 Reviewing the history and
purpose of both programs, the justices found, on the one hand, that the
purpose of "farming out" prisoners was to provide industry with cheap
labor and to save taxpayers the cost of boarding prisoners who did not
pose a threat to life. 31 The primary aim of the work release program, on
128. Id.; see N.C. CONST. art. III, § 6 (amended 1953).
129. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 226.
130. Id. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at 228. The six justices were Chief Justice Parker and Associate
Justices Bobbitt, Higgins, Sharp, Pless, and Branch. Id. The seventh justice, who did not
agree with the Governor, was Associate Justice Lake. Id. at 733, 152 S.E.2d at 229. For a
discussion of Justice Lake's separate opinion, see infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
131. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 730, 152 S.E.2d at 227. The six justices noted that,
under Article XI, Section I of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868, prisoners were subject
to "imprisonment with or without hard labor." Id. at 729, 152 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 1). They noted that the General Assembly in 1872 passed legisla-
tion permitting the "farming out" of convicts to railroads and other public corporations. Id. at
729, 152 S.E.2d at 226. This legislation provided that, in exchange for supplying the prisoners
with food and clothes, the railroad or corporation could utilize the prisoners if it implemented
certain safeguards. Id. at 729, 152 S.E. 2d at 226-27. In particular, the hiring party had to
"provide a good and sufficient guard to prevent the escape of such convicts.... give bond for
their safe keeping and proper treatment .... and return [them] to the penitentiary on the
termination of the contract." Id. (quoting Public Laws 1871-72 CCII). The prisoners received
no pay. Id. at 730, 152 S.E.2d at 227. Finally, the legislation excluded from its coverage
prisoners who had been sentenced on a "charge of murder, manslaughter, rape, attempt to
commit rape, or arson." Id.
In 1875, the members of the North Carolina Constitutional Convention incorporated the
"farming out" legislation into the state constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (amended
1875), cited in Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 729-30, 152 S.E.2d at 227. By adding this
provision, the state constitutionalized its relinquishment of control over the convicts involved
in the "farming out" program. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 730, 152 S.E.2d at 227. The
state also confirmed its decision not to rehabilitate the convicts. Id.
In 1957, the General Assembly authorized the Board of Paroles to permit prisoners to
participate in a work release program. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1 (1963). Unlike the
farming-out procedure, the work release program left the state in strict control of the prison-
ers. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 730-31, 152 S.E.2d at 227-28. The convicts worked
alongside people who were free, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1(0 (1963), but they had to
"return to quarters designated by the prison authorities" upon completing the day's assigned
work. Id. § 148-33.1(d) (1963). They had to pay taxes to the government as well as rent and
the costs of their upkeep. Id. § 148-33.1(0. Often the convicts had to forward the money they
earned to their families, whom they supported. 1d.; see Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 730,
152 S.E.2d at 227. In contrast to the "farming out" program, the work release program's
primary aim was to "prepare" the prisoners to "return" to freedom. Id. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at
227-28.
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the other hand, was to rehabilitate the prisoners for re-entry into soci-
ety. 132 In light of the "fundamental[ly] differen[t]" goals of the two pro-
grams, one to benefit society, the other to benefit the prisoners, the six
justices concluded that the General Assembly could enact the statute
permitting convicts who could not be "farmed out" to participate in the
work release program.
133
Associate Justice Lake disagreed with the other six justices.1
3 4
Writing separately, Justice Lake emphasized that the justices were to
evaluate the work release program in light of the state constitution, not
social policy.135 They were only to give their opinions as to the "mean-
ing of the provision, not its wisdom."1 36 Considering the original lan-
guage and intent of the 1868 North Carolina Constitution, Justice Lake
agreed with Attorney General Bruton that the Governor should deny
work release privileges to prisoners sentenced on a charge of murder,
manslaughter, rape, attempt to commit rape, or arson.
137
In response to Justice Lake's objection, the six other justices care-
fully noted that their opinion addressed only the "constitutional ques-
tion" before them and not "[p]olicy considerations."'' 3 8  The justices
realized that they would exceed the bounds of their judicial power and
infringe upon the legislative branch if they evaluated the legislative policy
itself.139 The seven justices all disagreed about how to define the bounda-
ries of judicial authority, a dispute they would have to resolve in future
opinions.
The Sales-Tax Election of 1969. In 1969, the General Assembly
passed an act authorizing each county in North Carolina to hold special
elections to consider whether to impose a one percent sales-and-use tax
on certain transactions."4 The General Assembly also enacted other
132. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at 227-28; see supra note 131.
133. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at 228.
134. Id. at 731-33, 152 S.E.2d at 228-29 (Lake, J.).
135. Id. at 732, 152 S.E.2d at 228 (Lake, J.).
136. Id. at 732, 152 S.E.2d at 229 (Lake, J.).
137. Id. at 732, 152 S.E.2d at 228 (Lake, J.). Justice Lake stated that the purpose behind
the provision prohibiting the "farming out" of convicts who have been sentenced for certain
crimes was to protect the public, since such convicts could escape. Id. (Lake, J.) Justice Lake
pointed out that the "possibility of escape" was no less in the work release program than it was
in the farming out program. Id. (Lake, J.) Indeed, in both programs the prisoner, "during
working hours, is outside the confines of the prison and is not under prison guard." Id. (Lake,
J.) Thus, the principal concern in evaluating either program should lie in protecting the pub-
lic. Id. (Lake, J.)
138. Id. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at 228.
139. Id.
140. Advisory Opinion in re Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 683, 169 S.E.2d
697, 697 (1969); see Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1228, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1424-30.
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measures permitting North Carolina voters to vote upon several constitu-
tional amendments at the next general election. 4 The question Gover-
nor Robert W. Scott confronted as a result of the passage of these
measures was whether the sales tax election constituted a general election
or a special election.142 If it were a general election, the people would
vote on the sales tax along with the six constitutional amendments at the
next general election, to be held in November 1970.143 If it were a special
election, the people would vote only on the sales tax at a special election
on November 4, 1969.14
Unable to determine from the state constitution which was the
proper date for the election, Governor Scott consulted Attorney General
Robert Morgan. 14' Reviewing the sales and use statute and each of the
six amendments, Morgan concluded that the sales tax election was not a
general election. 146 He expressed "some doubt about the matter," how-
ever, and suggested that the Governor write the supreme court justices
for an advisory opinion, noting that "ample legal precedent" existed for
such consultations.147
Governor Scott did make the request;148 five of seven justices re-
141. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 685, 169 S.E.2d at 698. One measure pro-
posed a revision of the state constitution. Id. (citing Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1228, 1969 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1461-85). Another proposed to "revise Article V concerning State and local fi-
nance." Id. (referring to Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1200, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1385-93). A third
measure proposed to amend article VI "relating to the qualifications of individuals to register
and vote in elections in North Carolina." Id. at 685-86, 169 S.E..2d at 698 (citing Act of June
23, 1969, ch. 1004, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1149-50). Other amendments provided for the
"authoriz[ation of] the General Assembly to fix the personal exemptions for income tax pur-
poses," "a reassignment of escheats," and a reduction in the number of state administrative
departments. Id. at 686, 169 S.E.2d at 698-99 (citing Act of June 16, 1969, ch. 872, 1969 N.C.
Sess. Laws 976-78; Act of June 13, 1969, ch. 827, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 920-21; and Act of
June 20, 1969, ch. 932, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1074-75, respectively). A final amendment "re-
quire[d the] convening of extra Sessions of the General Assembly upon request of three-fifths
of the members of each House." Id. (referring to Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1270, 1969 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1492-93). Each amendment contained the following language:
The amendment set out in Section 1 of this Act (or Sections 1 and 2 of this Act, as
the case may be) shall be submitted to the qualified voters of the State at the next
general election. That election shall be conducted under the laws then governing
elections in this State.
Id. at 686, 169 S.E.2d at 699.
142. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C at 684, 169 S.E.2d at 697-98.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 683-84, 169 S.E.2d at 697-98; see N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIII, § 2 (1875);
supra note 98.
146. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 685-86, 169 S.E.2d at 698-99.
147. Id. at 687, 169 S.E.2d at 699.
148. Governor Scott posed the question as follows:
Is the sales tax election to be held in each county on November 1969, under the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sponded that it was not a general election.' 49 In a brief paragraph the
five justices stated only that "after careful consideration and study," they
had concluded, "each for himself and herself," that the sales-tax election
was not a general election.150
Associate Justices Higgins and Lake refused to answer Governor
Scott's question.'51 They claimed that they could not express an opinion
prior to litigation without prejudice to the parties:
152
It is our opinion that we, as Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, should not express our views con-
cerning the law of the State governing any specific issue until
that issue is presented to the Court for decision in an appropri-
ate judicial proceeding between adversary parties to a justicia-
ble controversy. Otherwise, as justices, when subsequently
called upon t6 determine the same issue in such a proceeding,
we may find ourselves embarrassed by an advisory opinion
given without the benefit of argument and briefs. In that event,
the litigant who takes a contrary view of the law might feel his
case has been prejudged, thus denying him the benefit of his
day in court.'
53
Justices Higgins and Lake emphasized that their "failure to join" the
other justices in responding to the Governor's question in no way re-
flected their "agreement or disagreement" with the five justices'
opinion.1
5 4
Concerning the Separation of Powers. In 1981, the North Carolina
General Assembly passed two statutes severely limiting executive control
over the state budget and greatly enlarging the legislature's power over
fiscal operations.'1 5 Questioning the constitutionality of the two amend-
provisions of S. L. 1969, Chapter 1228, a general election within the meaning of
North Carolina Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, so that .the constitutional
amendments proposed by the 1969 General Assembly must be submitted to the vot-
ers at that time?
Id. at 684, 169 S.E.2d at 698. In his letter to the justices, Governor Scott stated that "[t]he
Attorney General advise[d him] that he [did] not think that the sales tax election [was] a
general election but that there may be some doubt about the matter." Id.
149. Id. at 687, 169 S.E.2d at 700. The five justices who responded that the sales-tax elec-
tion was not a general election were Chief Justice Parker and Associate Justices Bobbitt,
Sharp, Branch, and Huskins. Id. Associate Justices Higgins and Lake abstained. Id. at 688,
169 S.E.2d at 700 (Higgins & Lake, JJ.); see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
150. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 687, 169 S.E.2d at 699-700; see infra note 248.
151. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 688, 169 S.E.2d at 700 (Higgins & Lake, JJ.).
152. Id. (Higgins & Lake, JJ.).
153. Id. (Higgins & Lake, JJ.).
154. Id. (Higgins & Lake, JJ.). In fact, Justices Higgins and Lake stated that they were
"reluctant [to] abstain." Id. (Higgins & Lake, JJ.).
155. Authorized by Chapter 1127, § 82 of the 1981 North Carolina Session Laws, the Gen-
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ments, Governor James Hunt, Jr., along with Lieutenant Governor
James Green and Liston Ramsey, Speaker of the North Carolina House
of Representatives, asked Attorney General Rufus Edmisten for his opin-
ion on the matter."5 6 Based on Edmisten's response, the Governor con-
cluded that the statutes were "probably unconstitutional."15 7 At the
Attorney General's suggestion, however, the three officials made a joint
request to the North Carolina Supreme Court justices for an advisory
opinion.1
8
The first of the two amendments at issue involved executive and leg-
islative control over state budget transfers.1 59 Drastically curtailing the
governor's authority, the amendment required the governor to obtain the
permission of a specific committee of legislators before making certain
"'[t]ransfers or changes as between objects and items'" in an agency's
budget."
Under the 1981 amendment, an agency head could not submit a
request to the governor if the request involved more than a certain
amount of money, unless the "'Joint Legislative Commission on Gov-
ernmental Operations ha[d] given its prior approval for that trans-
fer.'"161 The amendment appeared to violate the constitutional
eral Assembly enacted amendments to §§ 143-23 and 143-16.1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 768-69, 295 S.E.2d 589,
589-90 (1982).
156. Id. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at 592. Governor Hunt served as Governor of North Carolina
from 1977 to 1985 and Rufus Edmisten served as Attorney General in North Carolina from
1975 to 1985. North Carolina Manual, supra note 100, at 527.
157. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at 592.
158. In their request, the three officials wrote, "the Attorney General has informed the
Governor that there is no North Carolina precedent on these precise points and, therefore, has
advised that this request be made for your advisory opinion." Id.; see infra note 281 and ac-
companying text.
159. See Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 768-69, 295 S.E.2d at 590.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-23 (1981), quoted in Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 768,
295 S.E.2d at 590. Prior to the amendment, the head of a state agency in need of more money
had been permitted to submit a request for money to the governor. Separation of Powers, 305
N.C. at 768, 295 S.E.2d at 590. The governor, as director of the budget, would forward the
request to the general assembly, which would then allocate money to the agency. Id.
161. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 82, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1127, § 82, amending
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-23, quoted in Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 768-69, 295 S.E.2d at
590. The amendment limited the amount of money the governor could transfer within an
institution or agency to "ten percent (10%) of the amount appropriated for that program line
item for that fiscal year." Id. If the governor wanted to transfer more funds, he first had to
obtain the approval of the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations. Sepa-
ration of Powers, 305 N.C. at 769, 295 S.E.2d at 590. The amendment further provided that
the ten-percent limit applied to all departments, except to "'[s]tate departments with a total
General Fund appropriation' of less than 'fifty million dollars ($50,000,000)."' 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch. 1127, § 82, amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-23, quoted in Separation of Pow-
ers, 305 N.C. at 769, 295 S.E.2d at 590. Moreover, the governor could make only transfers or
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requirement of separation of powers between the legislative and executive
branches of the state government by enabling a legislative body to "con-
trol major budget transfers proposed.., by the Governor in his constitu-
tional role as administrator of the budget." '162
The second amendment involved executive and legislative control
over federal block grant funds. 163 Prior to the amendment, the governor
and Advisory Budget Commission had the responsibility of recom-
mending the use of federal funds to the general assembly."' The general
assembly then would appropriate the funds. 65 In 1981, Congress made
money available to the states in the form of block grants.16 6 In response,
the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a provision requiring that
all federal block grants pass directly through the general assembly.1 67 A
new committee composed entirely of members of the general assembly
would make recommendations concerning the legislature's use of the
block grants.16 The statute further provided that, after the federal funds
were accepted, the governor could make proposals concerning the funds,
but his proposals were subject to the committee's approval prior to im-
plementation.1 69 A separation of powers issue arose because the provi-
sion authorized a committee of legislators to override the governor's
changes from salary monies with the Commission's approval. Id. Finally, the amendment did
not apply to transfers or changes within the Medicaid program. Sejaration of Powers, 305
N.C. at 769, 295 S.E.2d at 590.
162. Separation of Powers, at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 594.
163. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
164. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 769, 295 S.E.2d at 590. The Advisory Budget Com-
mission consists of persons appointed by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House,
and the Governor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-4 (1981). It assists the Governor in handling
federal funds under § 143-16.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which provides that
"[a]ll federal funds shall be expended and reported in accordance with provisions of the Execu-
tive Budget Act. Proposed budgets recommended to the General Assembly by the Governor
and Advisory Budget Commission shall include all appropriate information concerning the
federal expenditures in State agencies, departments and institutions." Id. § 143-16.1 (1978).
165. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 779, 295 S.E.2d at 595.
166. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357,
became law on August 13, 1981. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 770, 295 S.E.2d at 590-91.
167. The North Carolina General Assembly amended Section 143-16.1 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes in Chapter 1127, § 62 of the 1981 North Carolina Session Laws. Separa-
tion of Powers, 305 N.C. at 770, 295 S.E.2d at 591. The General Assembly passed the
amendment on October 10, 1981, two months after the implementation of the federal act. Id.
168. Under § 120-80 of the proposed statute, the committee was to be called the Joint
Legislative Committee to Review Federal Block Grant Funds. Id. at 770, 295 S.E.2d at 591.
It was to have thirteen members, twelve of whom were to be legislators. Id. at 776, 295 S.E.2d
at 594. The committee was to follow the "organizational rules" of § 120-82 and "make recom-
mendations" under § 120-83 of the new statute. Id. at 770, 295 S.E.2d at 591.
169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-84 (1981); Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 770-71, 295
S.E.2d at 591.
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proposals regarding the use of federal block grant funds.17 ° Thus, the
governor, the lieutenant governor in his capacity as President of the
North Carolina Senate, and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of
Representatives requested that the justices of the North Carolina
Supreme Court issue an advisory opinion concerning the constitutional-
ity of the statutory amendment.17
Agreeing to issue an advisory opinion, the justices focused on the
state constitution and North Carolina case law construing it. 172 They
quoted the North Carolina Constitution's separation-of-powers provi-
sion, which states that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other." 173 The justices then referred to the case of State ex rel.
Wallace v. Bone to demonstrate the drafters' commitment to the separa-
tion-of-powers principle. 74 In Wallace, the North Carolina Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a law that permitted the general assem-
bly to appoint four of its own members to a committee performing an
executive function.1 7' The justices thus prefaced their advice concerning
the constitutionality of the statutes with a reference to recent case law. 176
170. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 778, 295 S.E.2d at 595.
171. Id. at 772-73, 295 S.E.2d at 592. In their joint letter to the justices, the three officials
requested that the justices address the following two questions:
1. Is G.S. 143-23(b), as enacted by Section 82 of Chapter 1127 of the 1981 Session
Laws, consistent with, or contrary to, in whole or in part, the pertinent provisions of
the N.C. Constitution?
2. Is G.S. 120-84, as enacted by Section 63 of Chapter 1127 of the 1981 Session Laws,
consistent with, or contrary to, in whole or in part, the pertinent provisions of the
N.C. Constitution?
Id. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at 592.
172. Chief Justice Branch and Associate Justices Copeland, Exum, Britt, Carlton, Meyer,
and Mitchell issued the advisory opinion. Id. at 781, 295 S.E.2d at 596.
173. Id. at 773, 295 S.E.2d at 592; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
174. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 773-74, 295 S.E.2d at 592 (refering to State ex reL
Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982)).
175. Id. at 774-75, 295 S.E.2d at 593. In Wallace, the justices found that the Environmen-
tal Management Commission (EMC) served an executive function, not a legislative function.
Wallace, 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982). By permitting the general assembly to
appoint four of its own members to the executive commission, the law violated the separation-
of-powers provision of the state constitution. Id.; see Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 773,
295 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 6). Professor Orth maintains that "the
proper issue in Wallace was not separation of powers per se, but the separation of personnel,"
which the court failed to address. Orth, supra note 2, at 24.
176. Professor Orth contends that the court wrongly relied on Wallace in reaching its con-
clusion in Separation of Powers. See Orth, supra note 2, at 27-28. Orth asserts that Separation
of Powers involved retention of control by one branch over another branch, while Wallace
involved delegation of authority within a branch. Id. at 19-23. Only in the former instance did
a separation-of-powers issue arise, according to Orth, since the separation-of-powers principle
involves delegation among coordinate branches of government. Id. at 22-23.
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Turning their attention to the state budget transfers amendment, the
justices noted that the North Carolina Constitution provides for a "three-
step [budget-setting] process": the Governor proposes the budget, the
legislature enacts it, and the Governor administers it.' 7' According to
the justices, the budget transfers amendment violated the first step in the
process by permitting a committee of legislators to restrict the Gover-
nor's authority to make proposals concerning the budget." 8 They thus
concluded that the amendment violated the separation-of-powers provi-
sion of the state constitution. 179
With respect to the amendment involving federal block grant funds,
the justices noted two problems, only one of which the three officials had
asked them to address.I8  The first problem concerned whether the Gen-
eral Assembly had the power to accept federal grants on behalf of the
state and its agencies, and if so, whether it could determine the use of the
funds. 8 Based on an assumption that the General Assembly did have
such authority, the second issue involved whether the legislature could
delegate it to a committee of its members. 82 Citing the state constitu-
tion, the justices found that such a delegation would violate the separa-
tion-of-powers provision of the state constitution.1 83  The In re
Separation of Powers opinion represented the most complex and lengthy
advisory opinion that the justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court
had rendered since 1947.184
Constitutionality of Administrative Rules Review Commission. In
1985, the General Assembly considered legislation that would create an
Administrative Rules Review Commission.'8 " The effectiveness of sev-
eral sections of the proposed statute depended entirely on the North Car-
177. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 594; see N.C. CONST. arts. II &
III.
178. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 776-77, 295 S.E.2d at 594.
179. Id. at 777, 295 S.E.2d at 594; see supra notes 173-76.
180. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 779, 295 S.E.2d at 595.
181. Id. Thejustices stated that, since the officials did not request their opinions about this
aspect of the General Assembly's power, they would offer no advice on the matter. See infra
notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
182. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 779, 295 S.E.2d at 595.
183. Id. at 780-81, 295 S.E.2d at 596. Professor Orth maintains that the justices had no
reason to address the separation-of-powers issue at all, since the state constitution "specifically
charges the Governor with the duty of administering the 'budget as enacted by the General
Assembly.'" Orth, supra note 2, at 23 (citing N.C. CONST. art. III, § 59(3)).
184. The opinion was fifteen pages in length. The other five opinions ranged from three to
seven pages in length.
185. Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 890 (1985). The legisla-
tion appears in chapter 746 of the 1985 session laws. Sections 2 (subsection 7A-752), 5, 6,
18.1, and 19 of the chapter were in dispute. See Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, §§ 2, 5, 6, 18.1,
& 19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1012-17.
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olina Supreme Court's issuing an advisory opinion finding the statute
constitutional."8 6 Section 19 provided that sections 5 and 6, establishing
the new Commission, were to become effective thirty days from the date
the supreme court issued a not unfavorable advisory opinion. 1 7 A sub-
section of the statute giving the chief justice the power to appoint the
Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings was also made condi-
tionally effective.' 8 The proposal provided, however, that, in the event
the justices concluded that the chief justice could not constitutionally
exercise the appointment power, an alternative amendment giving the
Attorney General the appointment power would become effective.
189
The justices' advisory opinion would, in essence, either trigger or nullify
certain provisions of the statute.190 In an unprecedented move, the
North Carolina General Assembly wrote the justices of the supreme
court, requesting that they issue an advisory opinion approving the con-
stitutionality of the proposed legislation. 191
The justices noted that section 19 of the proposed statute gave their
advisory opinion the "force of law."' 192 A favorable advisory opinion
would establish an Administrative Rules Review Commission; an unfa-
vorable one would render the Commission ineffective.' 93 Further, a
favorable advisory opinion would enable the chief justice to appoint the
Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings; an unfavorable opin-
ion would vest the appointment power in the Attorney General. € The
justices stated that such extensive power should rest in the legislature and
not in the court, for it is the General Assembly's "prerogative to first
address and determine the constitutionality of its legislation."'' 95 They
therefore "respectfully decline[d]" to offer their advice.196 This was the
186. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 891.
187. See id. at 890-91 (citing Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
1017).
188. See id. at 890 (citing Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1012).
189. See id. at 890-91 (citing Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 756, § 19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
1017).
190. Id.
191. The justices who received the request were Chief Justice Branch and Associate Jus-
tices Exum, Meyer, Mitchell, Martin, Frye, and Billings. Id. at 892. The question posed was
"whether Sections 5 and 6 and subsection 7A-752 of Section 2, all being contained in Chapter
746 of the 1985 session laws, are consistent with the North Carolina Constitution." Id. at 890.
192. Id. at 891.
193. Id.; see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 890-91; see supra notes 188-89 and accompanying
text.
195. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 892.
196. Id.
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first time the justices had ever refused to issue an advisory opinion. 197
Regarding judicial districts, elections, and terms of office for superior
court judgeships. In 1987, the General Assembly enacted several meas-
ures affecting judicial districts, elections, and the terms of office for vari-
ous regular superior court judgeships.198 Doubting the constitutionality
of the legislation, Governor James G. Martin wrote to the justices for an
advisory opinion, stating that "there [was] not enough time for the nor-
mal judicial processes to work" before he had to execute the new laws.199
The Governor felt pressed for an expedited response, for if the laws were
constitutional, he had to notify the North Carolina State Board of Elec-
tions so that it could properly prepare for the 1988 judicial elections.2
The first question posed was whether the General Assembly could
create superior court judicial districts made up of portions of two or
more counties.2 °1 If so, the Governor questioned whether the legislature
could assign previously elected superior court judges to those new dis-
tricts without holding an election.20 2 Governor Martin then inquired
whether the General Assembly could enlarge the term of an elected regu-
lar superior court judge beyond eight years; 20 3 whether it could require a
candidate for a superior court judgeship to reside in the judicial district
for which he sought election;2° and finally, whether the legislature could
enlarge the terms of designated special superior court judges and appoint
special judges for the enlarged terms.20 5
To each of his questions the Governor proposed answers. No previ-
ous governor requesting an advisory opinion had ever given his own con-
clusions in the correspondence requesting the advisory opinion.
Addressing his first question, Governor Martin pointed out that histori-
cally, several superior court judicial districts had included more than one
county but no county had ever been divided into several judicial districts;
197. In 1929, the court had refused to issue an opinion as a court, but claimed that the
individual justices could render their opinions on issues put before them. See supra notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
198. Letter from Governor James G. Martin to the chief justice and associate justices of the
North Carolina Supreme Court 1-6 (July 9, 1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 9,
1987 Letter].
199. Id. at 2.
200. See id. at 4-8, 10-12.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Id. at 6. Article IV, § 16 of the state constitution calls for eight year terms. See N.C.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 16.
204. July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198, at 9.
205. Id. at 10.
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the General Assembly thus lacked authority to implement a new rule.20 6
In response to his other questions, the Governor maintained that the
state constitution provides for the election, not assignment, of regular
superior court judges to newly created judicial districts; 20 7 that regular
superior court judges could not serve beyond eight-year terms; 208 and
that the General Assembly could not appoint the special superior court
judges or enlarge the judges' terms.2 9 Finally, Governor Martin as-
serted that the legislature could not impose a residency requirement on
candidates for superior court judgeships. 210 In his letter requesting the
advisory opinions of the justices, the Governor concluded that the Gen-
eral Assembly had overstepped its bounds in enacting the legislation.
In a one-page response, Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr., empha-
sized the "disfavor" with which American and English courts tradition-
ally have viewed advisory opinions.21 The chief justice reminded the
Governor that advisory opinions are not "legally binding," being merely
opinions.2x2 Noting that the Governor's questions were "serious" and
difficult to answer, he concluded that the Governor could ascertain the
answers most effectively through the "use of traditional legal proce-
dures."2 '3 Recognizing the Governor's need to act quickly,214 the chief
justice reassured the Governor that he was "prepared, in the event an
appropriate action is instituted, to assign especially a superior court
judge, unaffected by the challenged statute, to hear the matter in the first
instance on an expedited basis. '215 For the second time in two years, the
justices declined to render an advisory opinion at the request of a gover-
206. Id. at 3-4.
207. Id. at 5. The Governor relied on §§ 1, 9(1) and 16 of article IV of the state constitu-
tion in reaching his conclusions. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 9(1), & 16.
208. July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198, at 7. Governor Martin cited § 16 of article IV of
the state constitution. See N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 16.
209. July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198, at 11. Based on the appointment power in § 5(8)
of article III of the state constitution, the Governor claimed that he, and not the General
Assembly, had the right to fill any vacancies in the superior court judgeships. Id.; see N.C.
CONsT. art. III, § 5(8); id. art. IV, § 19.
210. July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198, at 9-10. In his analysis, the Governor relied on
§ 6 of article VI of the state constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
211. Letter from Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr. to Governor James G. Martin 1 (July
20, 1987) (on file with author) (declining the Governor's request for advisory opinions con-
cerning superior court judgeships) [hereinafter July 20, 1987 Letter].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
215. July 20, 1987 Letter, supra note 211, at 1. The chief justice also stated that should the
trial court's decision be appealed, the supreme court would act quickly to resolve the issues.
Id.
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nor.216 Their refusal served as a prelude to their most recent refusal to
issue an advisory opinion in 1991.
Regarding the term ofjudicial office. In the general elections of 1988
and 1990, the citizens of North Carolina elected three judges to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and two to the North Carolina Supe-
rior Court.2"7 Prior to the elections, each superior court judge notified
the state Board of Elections of the district for which he desired to be
elected and each court of appeals judge indicated the "vacated seat" or
"unexpired term" of office he intended to fill.218 No judge specified to
the Board the term of office for which he was running.
219
At the general elections, without any notice to the candidates, the
North Carolina Board of Elections designated the terms of the offices on
the ballots.220 The Board provided that four of the five judges' terms
would end on December 31, 1992; the fifth judge's term would expire on
December 31, 1994.221 Upon election, the judges began serving their
terms. In 1991, with the expiration dates as listed on the ballots ap-
proaching, the judges brought an action at law, claiming that the Board
had erred when it listed the expiration dates on the ballots in the previous
216. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. The associate justices who joined
Chief Justice Exum in the July 20 letter were Justices Meyer, Mitchell, Martin, Frye, Webb,
and Whichard. July 20, 1987 Letter, supra note 211, at 2.
Upon receipt of the justices' response, Governor Martin brought suit. The trial court
found that each of the measures was constitutional except for the provision enlarging the terms
of the elected regular superior court judges beyond eight year terms. See State ex rel. Martin v.
Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 447, 385 S.E.2d 473, 477 (1989). On appeal, the supreme court found
that this measure was also valid. Id. at 456, 385 S.E.2d at 483. Thus, the judiciary resolved
the governor's questions in a manner contrary to the determinations he had expressed in his
request for the advisory opinion.
217. Judges John B. Lewis and Robert F. Orr were elected to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in the general election held in November of 1988. Letter from Governor James G.
Martin to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court 8-9
(June 28, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter June 28, 1991 Letter]. Judge James A. Wynn
was elected judge of the court of appeals and Judges W. Russell Duke, Jr. and Quentin T.
Sumner were elected judges of the superior court in the general election held in November of
1990. Id. at 9.
218. In his notice, Judge Lewis stated that he sought the position of" 'Judge of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals[,] the John C. Martin seat.'" Id. at 10. Judge Orr indicated that
he sought the position of "'Associate Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals for the
unexpired term of John Webb to succeed myself.'" Id. Judge Wynn sought the "'Court of
Appeals seat vacated by Charles Becton.'" Id. Judge Duke sought the position of" 'Superior
Court Judge, District 3-A.'" Id. Finally, Judge Sumner stated that he was running for the
position of" 'Superior Court Judge, Superior Court District 7-A.'" Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 13. The Board listed the expiration dates in keeping with the amended version
of § 163-9 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. at 15.
221. The terms of Judges Lewis, Orr, Wynn, and Duke were to end on December 31, 1992.
Id. Judge Sumner's term was to expire on December 31, 1994. Id.
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general elections.22 2 The judges then wrote to the Governor, demanding
a clarification of the terms of their offices.2 23 Specifically, the judges
asked Governor Martin to issue them constitutional commissions2 24 pro-
viding that they were to serve for eight year terms.225
Upon receipt of the judges' demands, Governor Martin requested an
advisory opinion from the supreme court justices concerning the issuance
of the commissions to the judges.22 6 Governor Martin posed several
questions, to which he gave tentative answers.227 The questions asked
were whether the issuance of the commissions to the judges was an exec-
utive or ministerial act; whether the commissions should recite the terms
of office for which the commissions had been issued; and whether the
commissions issued to the particular judges should be for eight-year
terms. 228 Governor Martin indicated that, in his opinion, the issuance of
the commissions was an executive act; that the commissions should state
the terms of office; and that the terms should be for eight years. 229 Nev-
222. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
223. June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 2.
224. All grants and commissions made by the Governor must bear the seal of the state in
order to be effective, as provided in section 10 of article III of the state constitution:
There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be kept by the Governor .... All grants
and commissions shall be issued in the name and by the authority of the State of
North Carolina, sealed with "The Great Seal of the State of North Carolina," and
signed by the Governor.
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 10.
225. June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 2.
226. Id. at 3. Governor Martin did not consult Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg for
an opinion prior to writing the justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court. The judges
whose terms were in dispute also "joined in [the Governor's] request for advice." See Letter
from Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr., and the Associate Justices of the North Carolina
Supreme Court to Governor James G. Martin 1 (Aug. 20, 1991) (on file with author) (respond-
ing to Governor James G. Martin's request for an advisory opinion concerning the constitu-
tional commissions of the judges) [hereinafter August 20, 1991 Letter].
227. June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 3; see supra notes 206-10 and accompanying
text (discussing Governor Martin's July 9, 1987 request for an advisory opinion).
228. June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 2-14.
229. Id. Governor Martin made clear his support for the position of the petitioning judges,
and delineated the constitutional bases for his belief. First, he noted that Article IV, § 14 of
the North Carolina Constitution "provides (i) that judges of the Court of Appeals and the
Superior Court shall be elected to office and (ii) that the terms for which they shall be elected
shall be for eight years." Id. at 14. He then referred to article IV, § 19 and its 1868 constitu-
tional "counterpart" regarding the filling of vacancies. Id. Both sections provide that appoin-
tees should fill vacancies for "terms only until the next election for members of the General
Assembly held more than 60 days after the vacancy occurs." Id.
Governor Martin then pointed out that, until 1967, the North Carolina General Statutes
followed the language of article IV, § 19 and the 1868 state constitution. In 1967, however,
the General Assembly amended the North Carolina General Statutes to provide that the term
of office of "Judges of the Court of Appeals and Regular Judges of the Superior Court elected
to office following a vacancy" would be "for the unexpired term of the vacating judge." Id. at
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ertheless, he requested an advisory opinion from the North Carolina
Supreme Court justices because he did not feel the "normal legal proce-
dures" would enable him to respond adequately to the judges'
demands.230
In a brief letter to Governor Martin, Chief Justice Exum noted that
the Governor appeared to have answered the questions himself, render-
ing the advice of the justices unnecessary. 231  The Chief Justice pointed
out that a case involving the same issue currently was pending in the
superior court.232 Finally, he reminded the Governor that the justices
viewed the advisory practice with "disfavor. 2 33 The justices thus re-
15. Based on the "principles of constitutional construction" referred to in State ex rel. Martin
v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448-49, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989), a case resulting from the
supreme court's refusal to issue an advisory opinion, supra note 216, Governor Martin con-
cluded that the General Assembly had "exceeded its authority" when it amended the statute.
June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 15-16.
In conclusion, Governor Martin stated that under the North Carolina Constitution,
"[tierms of office belong to judges, not judgeships," and that such terms of office are for eight
years from the date of election, "irrespective of whether the election was held following the
expiration of a term or at the end of an appointive term following a vacancy." Id. at 14. He
stated that, had the voters written in the expiration dates beside the candidates' names, he
would have given the dates more "weight." Id. at 17. He found, however, that, "[u]nder the
circumstances ... I do not give much weight to the ballot notation. It was a mistake, albeit an
honest mistake, made by the State Board of Elections." Id.
230. Governor Martin recognized that the justices "generally... prefer not to give advi-
sory opinions" but hoped that the justices would "consider giving [him an opinion since] the
use of normal legal procedures [would] not meet the need at hand." June 28, 1991 Letter,
supra note 217, at 1. The Governor did not specify why following "normal legal procedures"
would not suffice. Id. Usually, a governor asks the attorney general for an advisory opinion
and consults the justices only upon the attorney general's suggestion. See supra notes 5-9 and
accompanying text.
231. See August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226, at 1; see June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note
217, at 3.
232. See August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226, at 1. The case was Martin v. North
Carolina, 330 N.C. 412, 410 S.E.2d 474 (1991), which was pending in the Wake County Supe-
rior Court when Governor Martin submitted his request to the justices. In Martin, the
supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that requires the justices and
judges in the appellate division to retire from office upon reaching the age of seventy-two, even
if the terms for which they have been elected have not yet expired. Id. at 414-15, 410 S.E.2d at
475-76. Associate Justice Martin of the state supreme court and Judge Phillips of the court of
appeals had argued that the statute violated § 16 of Article IV of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, which provides that the judges and justices of the appellate division "shall hold office for
terms of eight years." Id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8).
233. August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226, at 2. The justices wrote,
As we have previously communicated to you, we generally disfavor the issuance
of advisory opinions. Such questions as you have submitted are better answered in
the context of adversarial proceedings, in which the Court can have the benefit of the
research of counsel, full briefing and argument on all aspects of the questions
presented.
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fused to proffer the requested opinion.234
III. CRITIQUE OF THE ADVISORY FUNCTION
A. The Rules
Judicial responses to executive requests for advisory opinions in the
twentieth century reveal several fundamental characteristics of the advi-
sory practice in North Carolina. First, the justices of the North Carolina
Supreme Court will issue advisory opinions only as individuals, not as a
court.2 35 Thus, in his request for an advisory opinion, the governor must
address the justices individually.236 Having considered the matter as in-
dividuals, the justices may or may not sign the collective opinion. They
may write separate opinions if they so choose.237 Second, the justices
render advisory opinions only as a matter of respect or courtesy to the
executive branch.2 8 They are free to decline the request, for no statutory
or constitutional provision compels them to issue the opinions.23 9 Third,
the justices will issue advisory opinions only if a justiciable controversy
exists and the relevant facts are presented to them in the request;2 ° they
234. Id. The Justices who participated in the response were Chief Justice Exum and Asso-
ciate Justices Meyer, Mitchell, Frye, Webb, and Whichard. Associate Justice Martin recused
himself presumably because he was a party to the lawsuit that ultimately reached the supreme
court on this question.
Just as the Governor's questions in the 1987 request were resolved through legal action,
supra note 216, the questions the Governor addressed to the justices in 1991 are currently
being decided through the legal system.
235. Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1985); see Advisory
Opinion in re Advisory Opinions, 196 N.C. 828, 829 (1929); Edsall, supra note 10, at 318.
236. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 891. The governor generally lists each justice's name
at the top of the letter requesting the opinion. He then begins the letter with "My Dear Sirs"
or "Gentlemen." In one letter, however, the governor addressed the justices as a group, begin-
ning the letter in the following manner: "TO: THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCI-
ATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA." Advisory
Opinion in re Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 683, 169 S.E.2d 697, 697 (1969). This
format arguably undermines the purpose of seeking an advisory opinion, which is to obtain the
opinions of the justices as individuals, not as a court. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 86-91, 134-37, 151-54 and accompanying text.
238. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 891; see Advisory Opinions, 196 N.C. at 829.
239. See Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 891; Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 688,
169 S.E.2d at 700; August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226, at 2; see also State v. Scoggin, 236
N.C. 1, 7, 72 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1952) (stating that "[n]one of the parties are entitled to an
advisory opinion from this Court").
240. See City of Henderson v. County of Vance, 260 N.C. 529, 532-533, 133 S.E.2d 201,
203-204 (1963) (stating that "it would be unwise for this Court to render an advisory opinion
on the questions posed, before all the pertinent facts have been found or agreed upon"); Wilson
v. City of High Point, 238 N.C. 14, 24, 76 S.E.2d 546, 553 (1953) ("We have decided this case
upon the agreed facts presented to us. To discuss other questions argued in the defendant
appellees' brief would be to render an advisory opinion, which we do not do.").
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will not issue advisory opinions regarding "hypothetical situations."' 241
Fourth, the justices will not issue advisory opinions to private liti-
gants.242 The matter at issue must involve the public and be "an emer-
gency gravely affecting the public interest." '243 Fifth, the justices will not
give "unnecessary advisory opinions" on questions the parties have not
put before them.2 " Finally, the matter in question must relate to statu-
tory construction or constitutional issues, not policy considerations. 245
Thus, in rendering advisory opinions the justices of the North Carolina
Supreme Court follow self-imposed guidelines.
B. The Practice
Between 1947 and 1985 the justices attempted to adhere to the first
rule: that they render advisory opinions only as individuals.246 In three
of the six advisory opinions, a governor prefaced his written request with
each justice's name but then stated in the letter that he was "seeking an
opinion of the Supreme Court."'247 In each instance, the justices ignored
the request directed at the court and responded that they signed the opin-
241. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Barnes, 257 N.C. 274, 276, 125 S.E.2d 437, 439
(1962) (refusing to "advise the trustee how it should act" in the absence of "necessary" facts
because courts do not provide mere advisory opinions with respect to hypothetical situa-
tions"); see also Kirkman v. Wilson, 328 N.C. 309, 312, 401 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1991) (declining
to address "abstract" questions in an advisory opinion); Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960) (declining to construe plaintiff's interests in the
trust estate on the grounds that "[t]he courts have no jurisdiction to determine matters purely
speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, declare social status, deal with theoretical problems,
give advisory opinions, answer moot questions, adjudicate academic matters, provide for con-
tingencies which may hereafter arise, or give abstract opinions"); Boswell v. Boswell, 241 N.C.
515, 519, 85 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1955) (stating that "the Court will not give advisory opinions or
decide abstract questions"); Bragg Dev. Co. v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 429, 79 S.E.2d 918, 920
(1954) ("The controversy... created presents a purely abstract question. Any judgment put-
ting it to rest would be wholly advisory in nature.").
242. Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App. 481, 489, 246 S.E.2d 805, 810, disc. rev. denied, 296
N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 958 (1979).
243. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
244. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 311, 357 S.E.2d 622, 630-31 (1987) (Mitchell, J., con-
curring in result) (noting that "the Court is most unwise.., to address" any other questions
because "[t]o do so amounts to rendering an entirely unnecessary advisory opinion on ques-
tions which need not and should not be reached or decided"); see supra notes 231-32 and
accompanying text; see infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 235-36 and accompanying text.
247. In three opinions, the governor framed his request by saying, "The question is, how-
ever, of such great importance that I feel justified in seeking an opinion of the Supreme Court."
See Advisory Opinion in re Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 684, 169 S.E.2d 697, 698
(1969); Advisory Opinion in re General Elections, 255 N.C. 747, 748, 127 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1961);
Advisory Opinion in re General Election, 244 N.C. 748, 748, 93 S.E.2d 853, 854 (1956).
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ions, "each for himself."248 In 1985, however, the justices declined the
request, 249 pointing out that "[t]he North Carolina Constitution does
not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions,"
a proposition which their predecessors first stated in 1929.250 They fur-
ther proclaimed that neither the court nor the members of the court had
the power to issue the opinion the legislature requested. 25' Thus, the
justices acted to curb a practice in which they had indulged for more
than two centuries.252
The second rule-that the justices render the opinions as a favor and
not as a matter of judicial duty-has prevailed by and large, but in some
cases it has been weakened by the forceful tone of the requests. 2 3 In
most of the letters requesting the justices' advice, governors have recog-
nized the justices' "discretion" in issuing the opinions. 54 The governors
have requested that the justices respond only "if in keeping with the pro-
prieties and functions of the Court" and have expressed their apprecia-
tion when the justices have responded.2 55 In some instances, however,
the governors appear to have pressured the justices. One governor con-
cluded his letter to the justices by saying, "I respectfully request the
members of the Court to furnish this advisory opinion at the earliest pos-
sible time on account of the urgency of the matter ... ."256 In a later
request, another governor wrote, "Your opinion on this question will be
highly appreciated and will guide the State officers on this highly impor-
tant question . . . I shall await your response. ' 257 Finally, in 1982,
Governor Hunt and leaders of the legislature reminded the justices that
248. In Sales-Tax Election of 1969, the justices signed the opinion "each for himself or
herself." 275 N.C. at 687, 169 S.E.2d at 699; see General Elections, 255 N.C. at 750, 127 S.E.2d
at 3; General Election, 244 N.C. at 749-50, 93 S.E.2d at 854.
249. Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1985). It is notable
that the legislature made the request.
250. Id. at 891; see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
251. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d at 891.
252. Id. at 891-92.
253. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
254. See Advisory Opinion in re Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. 727, 728, 152 S.E.2d 225,
226 (1966) (Governor Moore stated to the justices: "it is this question which I submit to you
for an advisory opinion, if, in your discretion, you are disposed to render one to me.").
255. See Advisory Opinion in re Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 684, 169 S.E.2d
697, 698 (1969); Advisory Opinion in re General Elections, 255 N.C. 747, 748, 127 S.E.2d 1, 2
(1961); Advisory Opinion in re General Election, 244 N.C. 748, 749, 93 S.E.2d 853, 854
(1956).
The justices "respectfully declined" to issue advisory opinions in 1985, 1987, and 1991.
See supra notes 196, 216, 234 and accompanying text.
256. Advisory Opinion in re Time of Election to Fill Vacancy in Office of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 232 N.C. 737, 738, 61 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1950).
257. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 684-85, 169 S.E.2d at 698.
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their request for advice was "[i]n accordance with established
practice.
258
The justices generally have followed the third rule, considering only
questions based on fact.259 For instance, in 1950, the justices advised the
governor regarding the proper construction of the state constitution with
respect to filling the vacancy caused by the death of supreme court Asso-
ciate Justice Seawell. 26 In 1956, 1961, and 1969, governors asked the
justices to address questions involving particular elections to be held on
specific dates.261 In 1966, 1982, 1985, and 1987, the justices were asked
to address questions involving the constitutionality of certain provisions
of the North Carolina General Statutes.262 In 1991, the justices were
asked to advise the governor regarding the constitutional commissions of
five named state judges.263
The fourth rule-that the justices only issue advisory opinions with
regard to emergencies gravely affecting the public interest-has been
258. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 767, 295 S.E.2d 589, 589
(1982); see also Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C at 687, 169 S.E.2d at 699 (Attorney
General Robert Morgan suggesting that Governor Scott ask for an advisory opinion of the
supreme court because, "[a]s you know, there is ample legal precedent for the Governor of
North Carolina to request the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on pressing matters of
this nature").
259. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
261. The 1956 opinion considered whether a special election for educational amendments
would be a general election if it were held before November. Advisory Opinion in re General
Election, 244 N.C. 748, 749, 93 S.E.2d 853, 854 (1956), discussed supra notes 93-104 and
accompanying text. In the 1961 opinion, the justices considered the proper construction of
article XIII of the state constitution with regard to a bond election. Advisory Opinion in re
General Elections, 255 N.C. 747, 748, 127 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1961), discussed supra notes 105-21 and
accompanying text. The 1969 opinion considered whether a sales-tax election constituted a
general election. Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. at 684, 169 S.E.2d at 697-98, discussed
supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
262. The 1966 opinion involved the construction of article XI, section 1, of the state consti-
tution in relation to the work release program authorized under North Carolina General Stat-
utes § 148-33.1. Advisory Opinion in re Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. 727, 727-28, 152
S.E.2d 225, 225-26 (1966), discussed supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text. The 1982
opinion involved the question of whether specific provisions of the general statutes violated
select provisions of the state constitution. Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at
592, discussed supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text. In the 1985 request, the governor
asked the justices to consider whether §§ 5 and 6 and subsection 7A-752 of § 2 of chapter 746
of the 1985 session laws would violate the North Carolina Constitution. Advisory Opinion in
re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 890 (1985), discussed supra notes 185-97 and accompa-
nying text. In the 1987 request, the justices were asked to decide upon the constitutionality of
a ratified bill. See July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198, discussed supra notes 198-216 and
accompanying text.
263. See June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, discussed supra notes 217-34 and accompa-
nying text.
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more difficult for the members of the court to apply.2" The justices gen-
erally have regarded anything that affects the voting public as an emer-
gency, sufficient to warrant the issuance of an advisory opinion.265 In
some instances, however, the justices have differed in defining an "emer-
gency." In 1950, six of the seven justices felt that filling a vacancy on the
North Carolina Supreme Court constituted an emergency sufficient to
warrant an advisory opinion.266 One justice, however, wrote that no
emergency existed; the emergency arose only because the Attorney Gen-
eral refused to advise the Governor and the Governor "should not be
required to [act] without competent legal advice."'2 67 Likewise, in 1966
the justices again differed in defining an emergency, this time with regard
to the prison work release program. Six of seven justices claimed an
emergency existed due to the harmful effects of putting work release pris-
oners "back behind bars. ' 268 One justice found that the emergency re-
sulted not from incarcerating the prisoners but from permitting the
prisoners to go free.269 Thus, although the justices generally have ad-
hered to the rule that they issue advisory opinions only with regard to an
emergency, they on occasion have differed in defining what constitutes an
emergency.
The justices have stood steadfastly by the fifth rule that they not
render unnecessary advisory opinions.270 For instance, in 1966, the jus-
tices stressed that the advisory opinion involving the work release statute
"relates solely to the constitutional question submitted to us." 271 The
opinion did not address policy considerations.272 Similarly, in 1982, the
justices refused to answer a collateral question that was not before
them. 273 The justices stated that they would not "engage now in the
lengthy research that would be necessary to answer it," but added that,
"[i]f our opinion on this question is deemed urgently needed, we will
consider a further request, provided it is accompanied by in-depth infor-
264. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 261.
266. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
267. Advisory Opinion in re Time of Election to Fill Vacancy in Office of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 232 N.C. 737, 743, 61 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1950) (Barn-
hill, J.); see supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
268. Advisory Opinion in re Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. 727, 727-28, 152 S.E.2d 225,
225 (1966); see supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
271. Work Release Statute, 268 N.C. at 731, 152 S.E.2d at 228; see supra notes 138-39 and
accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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mation and briefs with respect to the grants being considered. '2 74
In a marked change of position in regard to the advisory, the justices
in 1985 declined to issue an advisory opinion concerning the constitu-
tionality of proposed legislation.2 75 In 1987, they again refused to advise
the Governor concerning the constitutionality of a ratified bill, stating
that they only would hear the matter should the Governor bring a legal
action and appeal the trial court's decision.276 Finally, in 1991, the jus-
tices declined to issue an advisory opinion regarding the constitutional
commissions of five judges, stating that the issue was being litigated in a
pending case, making an advisory opinion inappropriate and
unnecessary.277
The basic premise underlying all of the judicial rules involving the
issuance of advisory opinions is that such opinions are only opinions;
they cannot and do not have the force of law. 78 Prior to 1985, however,
advisory opinions in North Carolina held a law-like status. The very
language of the requests indicated that the justices' advice would influ-
ence greatly, if not dictate, the actions of the inquirer. For instance, in
1950 Governor Scott wrote that the justices' answer would "enable" the
Attorney General to advise him so that he could act. 79 In 1956, 1961,
and 1969, governors stated that the justices' advice would "guide" them
in resolving the issues before them.2 "0 Arguably, had the governors not
intended to follow the "guidance," however, they would not have both-
ered to make the initial request. Likewise, in 1982, the Governor asked
the justices to create precedent for him to follow, stating that "no North
274. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 779, 295 S.E.2d 589, 595-
96 (1982).
275. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
278. See infra note 282.
279. Advisory Opinion in re Time of Election to Fill Vacancy in Office of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 232 N.C. 737, 738, 61 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1950).
280. Advisory Opinion in re Sales-Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 684-85, 169 S.E.2d
697, 698 (1969) (Governor Scott stating that "[y]our opinion on this question will be highly
appreciated and will guide the State officers on this highly important question as to when these
proposed amendments to the Constitution of this State should be submitted"); Advisory Opin-
ion in re General Elections, 255 N.C. 747, 748, 127 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1961) (Governor Sanford
stating that "[y]our opinion on the question presented will be appreciated and will guide me in
the fixing of a date to submit these important issues to the people"); Advisory Opinion in re
General Election, 244 N.C. 748, 749, 93 S.E.2d 853, 854 (1956) (Governor Hodges stating that
"[y]our opinion on the question presented will be appreciated and will guide me in the recom-
mendations which I shall make to the special session of the General Assembly as to appropri-
ate means to be taken looking to the solution of our educational problem").
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Carolina precedent on these precise points" at issue existed. 281  Until
1985 the inquirer thus asked for an opinion which he intended to follow
as if it were the law.
In 1985, in In re Advisory Opinion, the justices reasserted the propo-
sition firmly announced by their predecessors in 1929 that advisory opin-
ions are only opinions.282 The justices found that, because the opinion
which the legislature requested would have the force of law, they could
not acquiesce and give it.283 The justices insisted that they could not
interject themselves into the "stream of the legislative process" in this
way.284 Thus, in 1987, when Governor James G. Martin questioned the
justices regarding the constitutionality of legislation involving certain su-
perior court judgeships and indicated that the justices' response would
influence his course of action, the justices refused to issue an advisory
opinion.28 The justices found that, in addition to interfering with the
legislative process, the issuance of the advisory opinion would interfere
with the adversarial process that is the hallmark of the United States'
system of justice.286 Only through the use of briefs and argument could
the justices give the questions the "deliberative and reflective" treatment
which they required.28 7 Similarly, when Governor Martin asked several
questions concerning state judges' constitutional commissions and stated
that the justices' "answers... will determine the responses that I should
make," the justices again declined the request.288 Thus, the justices re-
cently have refused to render advisory opinions, apparently believing that
the adversarial process is the best judge of the issue in question.
281. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 772, 295 S.E.2d 589, 592
(1982); see supra note 158.
282. In response to the legislature's request, the justices briefly reviewed the bases of the
advisory practice in North Carolina. Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d
890, 890-91 (1985). They found no constitutional authorization for the practice and noted that
the justices had rendered advisory opinions in the past, "'as a matter of courtesy, and out of
respect to a coordinate branch of the government,'" but not as a matter of judicial duty. Id.
(quoting Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinions, 196 N.C. 828 (1929)). The justices fur-
ther reminded the legislature that advisory opinions are only opinions; "they have not and
could not have had the force of law." Id. Although the opinions may be "persuasive," they are
"not binding." Id.
283. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
284. Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d. at 892.
285. See July 9, 1987 Letter, supra note 198; July 20, 1987 Letter, supra note 211.
286. See July 20, 1987 Letter, supra note 211.
287. Id.
288. See June 28, 1991 Letter, supra note 217, at 2; August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226,
at 2.
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C. The Advantages of the Advisory Opinion
The advisory practice has several notable advantages. Permitting
the executive or legislative branches to submit an issue to the justices in
order to ascertain their positions prior to litigation saves the government,
potential parties, and the taxpayers money. If the justices find a pro-
posed statute to be unconstitutional, future parties, the government, and
the justices may avoid the expense in time and money of bringing suit.289
In addition, the government may refrain from implementing a law that
will later be held unconstitutional.29 Permitting the practice also simpli-
fies the law-making process.291 As one justice stated, a question involv-
ing "a dry matter of constitutional law" is often easier to deal with "than
it might be hereafter, when complicated with collateral considera-
tions, 292 such as the factual intricacies of an actual case.293 Moreover,
the advisory practice enables officials with less expertise in the law to
consult with those who deal with it daily, creating a more effective and
efficient system of state government.294 For example, a finding by the
justices that a proposed statute violates the state constitution might en-
able the branch making the proposal to modify it and more speedily pres-
ent it to citizens or legislators for a vote, hastening its implementation. 29
289. See ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 195-96, 251. Ellingwood argued that permitting
the justices to render advisory opinions "will reduce such probability [of future cases] to a
minimum, thus saving a great deal of litigation." Id. at 195-96. If the case does come to trial,
then the judges are "free to change their minds upon further argument." Id. at 196, He
further reflected:
As a matter of policy, if the justices can eliminate a great deal of litigation in ad-
vance, by indicating their expert views on legislative acts, why should they not do so?
Why should it be necessary for the people to run the risk of error in matters that
often are not settled for years after a statute is passed?
Id. at 201. After making this statement, Ellingwood quickly caught himself, noting that advi-
sory opinions are not binding anyway. Id. at 201-02.
Despite Ellingwood's argument for the efficiency of the advisory opinion, it should be
remembered that the issuance of an advisory opinion itself takes time.
290. See id. at 251.
291. Id. at 253-54.
292. Id. at 254 (quoting Advisory Opinion In re The Term of Office of the General Assem-
bly that was Elected in April, 1868, 64 N.C. 785, 786 (1870)).
293. See id.
294. Id. at 164. Ellingwood explained:
the purpose of the advisory opinion scheme was to secure to officials whose connec-
tion with the government is merely temporary, whose qualifications for dealing with
the difficult problems of political science are often meager and whose ordinary
sources of information are sometimes prejudiced or inadequate, the expert advice of
other officials upon questions with which they are especially competent to deal thor-
oughly and without prejudice.
Id.
295. Id. at 253.
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Thus, the advisory practice may be a "useful instrument of government"
which helps eliminate waste.29 6
D. The Disadvantages of the Advisory Opinion
The principal argument against permitting extra-judicial opinions29 7
is that the practice violates the separation of powers as mandated by the
Constitution of North Carolina. 298 One of the reasons the drafters in-
cluded the separation-of-powers provision in the state constitution was to
"preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary."'2 99 Indeed, the
instructions to one of the delegations charged with drafting the constitu-
tion required the drafters to observe "[tihat the judging power shall be
entirely distinct from and independent of the law making and executive
powers."'3"o In order to preserve the system of checks and balances in
the government, the instructions also required the drafters to be mindful
that a person in one branch could not exercise authority in another
branch.30 I In State ex rel Wallace v. Bone,"°2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court noted that North Carolina is "one of the few states, if not
the only state," that does not allow its governor to veto legislative enact-
ments. 3  The court stated that "[t]he clear implication [of disallowing
the executive veto] is that our people do not want the chief executive to
have any direct control over our legislative branch. ' ' 3 4 Arguably the
296. Id. at 251, 257. Concluding his book, Ellingwood asserted that "[tihe greatest prob-
lem before political scientists today is to reconcile democracy and efficiency." Id. at 252.
297. While advisory opinions are theoretically "extra-judicial," it is reasonable to ask
whether any question addressed to all the justices and answered by them jointly can ever be
"extra-judicial."
298. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; Edsall, supra note 10, at 335 & n.144; supra notes 50-53,
173 and accompanying text.
299. State ex rel Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 532, 359 S.E.2d 783, 791 (1987) (Martin,
I., dissenting).
300. State ex reL Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 597, 286 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1982) (quoting 10
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 870a, 870b, 870g, 870h (W. Saunders ed., Ra-
leigh, N.C., J. Daniels, 1890)). The instructions were given to the delegation of drafters from
Orange County. Id. at 597, 286 S.E.2d at 82; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text
(describing instructions to the Mecklenburg County delegates regarding the separation of
powers).
301. The instructions to the delegation of drafters provided
[t]hat no person shall be capable of acting in the exercise of any more than one of
these branches at the same time lest they should fail of being the proper checks on
each other, and by their united influence become dangerous to any individual who
might oppose the ambitious designs of the persons who might be employed in such
power.
Wallace, 304 N.C. at 597-98, 286 S.E.2d at 83; see Orth, supra note 2, at 3-6.
302. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
303. Id. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83.
304. Id.
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people of North Carolina likewise do not want the judiciary to have any
direct control over the executive branch. In keeping with Wallace, extra-
judicial advisory opinions addressing the constitutionality of legislative
enactments in response to executive requests potentially violate the sepa-
ration-of-powers provision of the North Carolina Constitution.
In addition to the dispute involving the constitutionality of advisory
opinions, the advisory practice has faced other challenges. Opponents of
the advisory practice argue that permitting the justices to express their
views on an issue prior to litigation denies a litigant his day in court.30
Further, because the justices offer the advice "without the benefit of ar-
gument and briefs, ' 306 the advice itself is thought to be dangerously un-
sound. The nonbinding force of the opinions does not sap their power,
for the justices presumably would be reluctant to "overrule" their earlier
advisory opinions.30 7 On the other hand, if advisory opinions are not the
work of the court in its official capacity, future justices might be more
willing to "overrule" a previous advisory opinion.
E. Approaches to Advisory Opinions in Other Jurisdictions
For many of the reasons stated above, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to issue advisory opinions since President Washing-
ton's first request for advice in 1793.308 The Supreme Court has limited
itself to deciding actual disputes, maintaining that to advise coordinate
branches of government concerning issues which may or may not come
to pass would be a waste of judicial resources and time.30 9 Further, the
Supreme Court has asserted that the Justices' issuing advisory opinions
directed to coordinate branches of government would violate the separa-
tion-of-powers principle implicit in the federal constitution. 310 In Flast v.
Cohen,311 the Court stated that "the implicit policies embodied in Article
III, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions on
federal courts., 312 The rule "implements the separation of powers" and
305. See supra notes 152-53, 233 and accompanying text.
306. Advisory Opinion in re Sales Tax Election of 1969, 275 N.C. 683, 688, 169 S.E.2d 697,
700 (1969); see supra notes 153, 233 and accompanying text; see also July 20, 1987 Letter,
supra note 211 (stating that "use of traditional legal procedures would allow the courts to
consider them benefitted by briefs and arguments").
307. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see infra note 328 and accompanying text.
But see supra note 289 (stating that Justices are free to overrule advisory opinions).
308. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
309. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1911); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2, at 43 (1989).
310. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 309, § 2.2 at 43.
311. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
312. Id. at 96.
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"also recognizes that such suits often 'are not pressed before the Court
with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely
framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument
exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting
and demanding interests.' ,313 The Court, therefore, has had to differen-
tiate between justiciable controversies, which it may address in regular
court opinions, and nonjusticiable matters that would require advisory
opinions which it has found to be impermissible.314
In order to distinguish a controversy subject to judicial decision
from a controversy that would give rise to advice in the form of an advi-
sory opinion, the Supreme Court has followed several guidelines. First,
the Court will not offer an opinion if the disputed issue may come before
it in litigation.31 5 Second, the Court will not render an opinion if the
opinion, however favorable, would influence the resolution of the issue in
dispute.31 6 In Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp. ,317 the board of a congressionally authorized agency passed an or-
der that was subject to the President's approval.318 The President stated
that he would approve the order only with modifications; the board com-
plied and altered the order, then requested that the Court review the
order.31 9 The Supreme Court declined. 320 The Justices reasoned that,
since the President had the ultimate say on the matter and since he had
approved the order as amended, their opinion was of no consequence.32'
The Court wrote that,
To revise or review an administrative decision which has only
the force of a recommendation to the President would be to
render an advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form ....
This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give
advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. It
has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional
Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on
the parties ... 322
The Court derives its power and preserves its prestige through the issu-
ance of well-reasoned, logical opinions. Were the Court to haphazardly
313. Id. at 96-97 (1968) (quoting United States v. Fruehauf, 356 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)).
314. Id.
315. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 309, § 2.2 at 44.
316. Id. § 2.2, at 45.
317. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
318. Id. at 104-05; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 309, § 2.2, at 46.
319. Chicago & S. Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 110-11.
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render non-binding judgments, it would sacrifice its credibility and lose
its authority within the tripartite structure.323
Nine of the ten states that once permitted the advisory practice
without constitutional or statutory authority now prohibit it, for many of
the reasons the United States Supreme Court has articulated in the fed-
eral realm. For example, nearly twenty years after the North Carolina
Supreme Court issued its first advisory opinion in 1848,324 the Supreme
Court of Errors in Connecticut banned advisory opinions.325 The Con-
necticut court criticized the non-binding character of advisory opinions
and claimed that the advisory practice conflicts with the principle of the
separation of powers.326 Characterizing advisory opinions as "mere[] ad-
vice, ... of no more authority than the opinion of any other five judicious
lawyers, ' 32 7 the judges emphasized that, without the benefit of "argu-
ments of counsel" and without a "searching investigation of the princi-
ples involved," a Connecticut court would deprive future parties of their
"right to our unbiased judgment. ' 328 The judges noted that other states
323. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the judiciary was not equipped to address
political issues. The Court wrote that
[s]uch decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments
of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and in-
volve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor respon-
sibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id. at I 11; see supra notes 138-39, 271-72 and accompanying text. Although the "decision" in
Chicago & Southern Air Lines involved foreign policy (the regulation of foreign carriers present
in the waters and territories of the United States), it is arguable that the Court's statement
would apply to its role with regard to questions of domestic policy as well.
324. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
325. Reply of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly, 33 Conn. 586
(1867).
326. Id. at 586-87; see Edsall, supra note 10, at 335 n.144.
327. Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. at 586. The judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors refused to give advisory opinions because
Such action on our part would be clearly extra-judicial. It would be a case purely
of advice and not ofjudgment. There are no parties before us, and nothing for us to
adjudicate in any sense of the term. Our action being extra-judicial, and really
rather our individual than official action, it can not be of any binding character
whatever. No Judge of the Supreme or Superior Court, in any case hereafter before
him, would be bound by our opinion. We ourselves should not be bound by it. Being
merely advice, it would be in contemplation of law, and probably in fact, of no more
authority than the opinion of any other five judicious lawyers, except perhaps as we
ourselves, if sitting upon any such case, might be inclined to adhere to an opinion
which we had expressed.
Id. at 586-87.
328. Id. at 587. Commenting on the potential bias to the parties, the justices of the Con-
necticut Supreme Court noted that
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permit the advisory practice by statute, but questioned the constitutional-
ity of such statutory authorization.329 In conclusion, the Connecticut
judges insisted that, although they had issued advisory opinions in prior
instances, they could have declined the requests just as easily.33° Unlike
the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Connecticut Court recognized in
due course the separation-of-powers problem inherent in issuing advisory
opinions and consequently forbade the advisory practice before it became
tradition.
In a more recent decision, Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., the
New York Court of Appeals reviewed the reasons the New York courts
and most other state courts no longer render advisory opinions.331 The
Court of Appeals first noted that "the role of the judiciary is to 'give the
rule or sentence,' and thus the courts may not issue judicial decisions
So far as our opinion would be regarded as having authority, and so far as we
ourselves would be influenced by it in any future case before us, there are the more
serious objections to our giving such an opinion upon a purely exparte hearing, with
no arguments of counsel, no searching investigation of the principles involved, and
only the conclusion that we can best arrive at upon a comparison of our several
impressions on the subject in a consultation among ourselves.
Id. The judges concluded that "it is very clear any expression of opinion on our part becomes
a pre-judgment of a question that may come before us or other judges of our courts for adjudi-
cation." Id.
329. Id.; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
Until 1682, the magistrates in Massachusetts asked the clergy for advice concerning ques-
tions of law. ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 31. In 1780, John Adams reportedly drafted the
Massachusetts Constitution, explicitly providing for the advisory practice in the state constitu-
tion. Id. at 32-33. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered its first advisory opin-
ion in 1781. Id. at 33.
The years 1820 and 1854 brought proposals for the repeal of the advisory opinion clause
in the Massachusetts Constitution, supra note 46, but both proposals met defeat. ELLING-
WOOD, supra note 4, at 35, 37.
Diverse views of the value of advisory opinions found voice in Massachusetts. Those
against the practice claimed that it violated the separation-of-powers principle and that it
tossed the court into the "vortex of politics." Id. at 37. They further asserted that allowing
the judiciary to issue advisory opinions invited the legislature and executive departments to
shirk their responsibilities. Id.
Those in favor of the advisory practice found it beneficial and efficient. They claimed
that it worked well in practice, that no evil had resulted, that it secured a desirable
uniformity of action in questions under the constitution and that the supreme court
of the State can render no better service to the Commonwealth than in answering
such questions as may be propounded to them by the legislature.
Id.
To this day the Massachusetts Constitution continues to authorize the advisory practice.
Since 1877, however, the justices have "asserted a claim to considerable discretion in refusing
their advice." Id. at 38.
330. Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. at 587-88.
331. Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 N.Y.2d 349, 354, 525 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830, 520
N.E.2d 546, 549 (1988).
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that 'can have no immediate effect and may never resolve anything.' 9t332
The court then noted that "an action 'may not be maintained if the issue
presented for adjudication involves a future event beyond control of the
parties which may never occur.' " 33 3 The court further found that the
ban against the advisory practice upholds the integrity of the judicial
system. It "not only prevents dissipation of judicial resources, but, more
importantly, prevents devaluation of the force of judicial decrees which
decide concrete disputes. '334 Based on these reasons, most of the states
which once permitted the advisory practice now disallow it.
E. Should the Advisory Practice Continue in North Carolina?
North Carolina is the only state in the Union that permits the jus-
tices of its highest court to issue advisory opinions without explicit con-
stitutional or statutory authorization.335 Ironically, North Carolina is
also one of the few states that explicitly provides for the separation of
powers in its state constitution.336 In recent years, various persons, the
justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court in particular, have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the advisory practice.337 Some critics
claim that the advisory practice violates the explicit state constitutional
provision requiring the separation of powers in state government. They
maintain that, although superficially voluntary and advisory, an advisory
opinion is, in effect, binding upon the branch seeking the opinion, since it
has been sought for the express purpose of obtaining specific guidance.338
In addition, those who oppose the practice assert that permitting the
judges to rule on proposed legislation unconstitutionally interjects the
judiciary into the legislative process. 339 In response to the contention
that advisory opinions save money and time, opponents of the practice
332. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 410, 160 N.E. 655,
657 (1928); New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Carey, 42 N.Y.2d 527, 531, 399
N.Y.S.2d 621, 623, 369 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (1977)).
333. Id. (quoting American Ins. Ass'n v. Chu, 64 N.Y.2d 379, 385, 487 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313,
476 N.E.2d 637, 639, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803 (1985)).
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; see Orth, supra note 2, at 11-17 (com-
paring the North Carolina Constitution's separation-of-powers provision with the similar pro-
visions found in the state constitutions of South Carolina, Indiana, West Virginia, Georgia,
and Colorado).
337. See Advisory Opinion in re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1985); supra
notes 195-97, 250-52 and accompanying text; July 20, 1987 Letter, supra note 211; supra notes
211-13 and accompanying text; August 20, 1991 Letter, supra note 226; supra notes 231-34
and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 286, 301-04 and accompanying text.
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argue that achieving efficiency in government never has trumped a con-
stitutional fight. Finally, the critics state that, if the federal courts can
hold the advisory practice unconstitutional based on an implied separa-
tion-of-powers provision in the United States Constitution, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has even more reason to hold advisory opinions
unconstitutional since the state constitution contains an express separa-
tion-of-powers provision. As a result of these criticisms and an increas-
ing consciousness that the advisory practice violates the separation-of-
powers provision in the state constitution, the advisory opinion cannot
survive in North Carolina.
F Implications of the Demise of the Advisory Practice
A finding that the North Carolina Constitution prohibits the justices
of the North Carolina Supreme Court from issuing advisory opinions
would force the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment to shoulder their constitutionally delegated responsibilities with
greater deliberation. The legislature would propose and enact legislation;
the governor would execute the law; and the judiciary would determine
the constitutionality of the law and adjudicate disputes based on that
law."4 The governor could not consult the judiciary about the constitu-
tionality of an act prior to its execution. The legislature could not make
an enactment contingent upon an opinion of the justices. The legislature
would make its own proposals regarding the law and the executive would
make its own decisions in executing the law. Each branch would func-
tion separately, and yet each would serve as a check on the other
branches. The three branches of government would fulfill their constitu-
tionally mandated duties 341 without resorting to measures of self-im-
posed restraint which the practice of rendering advisory opinions
requires.
It has been asserted that the "separation of powers should be an
instrument both of democracy and efficiency. ' 342 Ellingwood claimed
that permitting the judges to render advisory opinions is one solution to
the "problem" of "reconcil[ing] democracy with efficiency. ' 343 Yet a
state constitution like that in North Carolina, which explicitly provides
for the separation of powers, does not contemplate the type of "reconcili-
ation" Ellingwood envisions. In such a state, the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches should check-not advise-one another. This is
340. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
342. See ELLINGWOOD, supra note 4, at 251.
343. Id. at 252, 257.
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because, although the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to advisory
opinions, a type of "stare opinionibus" exists.3 " Judicial advice in the
form of advisory opinions quickly assumes the status of legal precedent,
encroaching upon the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial au-
thority. Because the drafters of the North Carolina Constitution ex-
pressly provided for the separation of powers of government, and because
the advisory practice crosses those boundaries, the justices of the North
Carolina Supreme Court should lay to rest the advisory practice in North
Carolina.
MARGARET M. BLEDSOE
344. Id. at 236.
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